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ABSTRACT 
One of the maln objectives of this study is to evaluate the 
performance of the Tk . 1000 million Special Agricultural Credit 
Programme (SACP) with respect to its stated objectives . The main 
objective of this programme is to increase the flow of institutional 
credit In the rural financial market in general and to provide credit 
to the small , marginal farmers and share - croppers In particular . 
Such farmers constitute the overwhelming majority of the farming 
population . 
v 
This study based on a survey conducted by the Bangladesh Bank 
(Central Bank of the Country) one year after launching the Programme . 
In the survey data were collected simultaneously from those respondents 
who participated in the Programme and those who did not participate In 
the Programme . The characteristics of those respondents who did 
participate In the Programme have been analysed by the study team who were 
involved in the survey and a report has been submitted to the Bank. 
study was concerned with the ' dual ' part of the survey, that is, 
This 
respondents who did not participate in the Programme. In concentrating on 
the dual survey , the general hypothesi' was that Lhos(' rl'spondc nts who (lid 
not participate in the programme were mostly small farmers. The results 
of our (.1n · lysis suppor ted this hYl)Q thesis which lS fur ther confirmed by 
the results of the primal survey . The overall results suggest that the 
'l'k . 1000 lillion Speciul Agricul tural Crcdi t Progrurrune L:1iled to mee L its 
major objective . 
Another important task of this study is to analyse the nature of 
the demand for credit among the farming households. The analyses 
undertaken indicate that the demand for credit among the non-participants 
vi 
in the Special Credit Programme varies according to farm size and the 
tenurial status of a farmer . Furthermore, regional differences also 
influence the demand for credit . 
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CHAPTER 1 
I TRODUCTION 
1 . 1 Agriculture in the Economy of Bangladesh 
Bangladesh lS a deltaic region of about 55 , 000 square miles sustaining 
a population of 87 million , is one of the most densely populated countri es of 
the world . The basic structure of the economy is predominantly rural and 
agricultural and 90 per cent of the population lives in rural areas . within 
the rural sector , agriculture plays a critical role in the overall socio-
economlC progress of the nation. In other words, agricultural development lS 
Slne qua non for the overall development of the country. 
An analysis of the structure of GDP clearly reveals the importance of 
the agricultural sector In the economy of Bangladesh. Table 1 . 1 shows a 
comparative picture of the sectoral breakdown of the GDP for the period 
1 969 - 70 to 1977-78 . 
Year 
1969- 70 
1970- 71 
19 71- 72 
1972- 73 
1973- 74 
1974- 75 
1975- 76 
1976- 77 
1977- 78 
TABLE 1 . 1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF GDP 
DURING 1969- 70 TO 1977-78 (at 1972-73 prices) 
Agricul ture Industry 
60 . 4 8 . 3 
62 . 1 7 . 4 
64 . 4 4.7 
60 . 1 7 . 3 
60.1 7 . 6 
58 . 7 7.4 
58 . 8 7.6 
57 . 0 8 . 2 
56 . 7 8 . 4 
Source : Economic Review , Planning Commission 1978- 79. 
Others 
31 . 2 
30 . 5 
30 . 9 
32 . 6 
31 . 3 
33 . 9 
31 . 6 
34 . 8 
34 . 9 
From Table l . lit appears tha t over the last 9 years , a negligible shift 
has taken plac with respect to the sectoral contributions to the gross 
2 
domestic product . This clearly indicate.) that in the foreseeable 
future , agriculture will continue to dominate as a backbone of the economy. 
Agri culture ' s share of total employment provides another indication of 
the role of this sector in the national economy as can be seen from Table 1.2. 
Year 
Sector 
Agricu l ture 
Industry 
Services 
TABLE 1 . 2 
PERCENTAGE OF LABOUR FORCE EMPLOYED IN 
AGRI CULTURE AND OTHER SECTORS 
1960 
87 
3 
10 
Source : World Development Report , 1979 , p . 162 
1977 
78 
7 
15 
From Table 1 . 2 it can be observed that over the last one and half decades 
there has been a very slow shift in the share of agriculture in the total 
employment . Nevertheless , this sector accounted for about 80 percent of the 
country ' s total foreign exchange earnings which is vitally needed for 
development . 
Bangladesh has a land area of about 35 . 3 million acres , of which 20.4 
million acres are cultivable . Allowing for an average cropping intensity of 
149 percent , the total c ropped area comes to ubout 30.4 million acres . 
Agriculture mainly consists of crop productions and approximately 40 percent 
of the GOP is derived from crops of whi c ll three - fourth s comes from rice alone . 
oreover , rice covers 80 percent of the total cropped area and the remalnlng 
20 percent is coverc by jllte ~nd other crops. In other wor~s, growth ln 
rice production is a major determinant of the growth in agriculture . In 
spite of that the productivity of agriculture in general and rice in purticular 
3 
has not shown any substantial improvement over the last few decades . The 
low yield per acre in agriculture is due mainly to the backward technology 
used and the lack of substantial financial investment in the infrastructural 
development of this sector . As a result Bangladesh has been experiencing 
a shortage of foodgrains supplied from the domestic sources since the early 
fifties [Clay , E . J ., 1979] . But in recent years the foodgrain deficit has 
deteriorated further which has imposed an increasinq burden on the national 
economy . To make up thi s deficit to meet the incremental domestic demand 
generated by rapid population growth (about 2.7 percent per annum) , the 
import of foodgrains has become a cornmon phenomena which can be seen from 
Table 1 . 3 . 
Year 
1959- 60 
1969 - 70 
1972 - 73 
1973 - 74 
1974- 75 
1975- 76 
1976- 77 
1977- 78 
1978- 79 
Note : 
+ 
* 
TABLE 1 . 3 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF FOODGRAINS IN BANGLADESH 
Item Domestic product i on 
(Ricc & whcCl t) 
Imports 
(Rice & wheClt) 
(million m. tons) (million m. tons) 
8 . 51 
11 . 92 
10 . 02 
11 . 83 
11 . 22 
12 . 78 
11 . 82 
13 . 11 
13 . 10 
. 61 
1 . 55 
2 . 83 
1 . 67 
2 . 29 
1 . 47 
.81 
1.64 
1 . 67 
One metric ton = 2205 lbs . 
Population 
(million) 
51.90 
69.22 
74 . 00 
76.00 
78 . 50 
80 . 90 
83 . 10 
85 . 31 
87 . 8 * 
Per year / 
cClpita 
availability+ 
(lbs) 
358 
398 
358 
362 
354 
3GO 
310 
347 
325 
The average per capita calorie requirement in Bangladesh has been 
calculated at 15 89 daily . If cereals were to constitute 84 percent 
of this total , this would imply a goodgrain rcquirrnent of 13.2 ounces 
per person per day [Che n , L . C., 1975J . 
Two year plan projection . 
Source : Economic Review , Planning Commission, 197 8-79 . 
4 
From Table 1 . 3 it can be observed tha~ the total domestic production of 
foodgrains which was 8 . 5 million tons in 1959-60 has increased to 13 million 
tons In 1978-79. If we look at the foodgrain import figures, it is apparent 
that In spite of a rlslng trend in rlce and wheat production during the 
seventies , foodgrain imports have remained high during the seventies. 
On the other hand , the t otal population of the country increased 
from 52 million In 1959- 60 to about 87 million in 1978-79 . Therefore, the 
slow growth rate of foodgrain production l coupled with the faster growth rate 
of population has created a continuous gap between the availability of food-
grain from domestic production and the actual food consumption of the country, 
although more than 80 percent of the cultivable land is devoted to food crops . 
These imports of foodgrains take the major share of the country · s foreign 
exchange earnlngs every year . For instance , during 1977-78 , total export 
earnlngs stood atTK.7 , 400 million whereas the cost of the import of 1.64 
million tons of foodgrains wasTK.4490 million which lS about 61 percent of 
the total export earnings of the coun -try . r1oreover, this lncrease In food-
graln imports did not lmprove the per capita availability of foodgrains which 
remalns comparable to that of 1959-60 (Table 1.3) . 
In view of the above , the government had given top most priority in its 
development strategy to achieving foodgrain self-sufficiency during the First 
Five Year Plan (FFYP , 1972 - 73to1977 - 78). Even though food g rain production reached 
a new high , 13 . 1 million tons in the final year of the FFYP, the country 
nevertheless imported 1 . 64 million tons of foodgrains . In spite of this 
failure , the government has agaln committed itself to achieve food grain self-
sufflej('nC'y by tlw en d oC S eond Fiv(' Y(',lr P1.:1I1 commC'l1C'inq In 19£10 . Durinq 
the interim gap between plan periods the government has lau~hed a Two Year 
P 1 Cl n ( J u 1 y 197 8 to J un e 1 <) 80) and <1 uri n q t hi s per i 0 d ,1. rn r 1 i () ref r u r t i :; be i n q 
1 The growth rate of rice production during the period from 1968- 69 to 
1976-77 was 2.14 percent per annum - [Development statistics of Bangladesh 
Agri c ulture, 1978] . 
5 
made Ito move towards self-sufficiency in foodgrains at a faster rate so 
that the nation can undertake bold steps in its thrust for rapid development 
in the Second Five Year Plan ' [Two Year Plan Report , 1978-80]. 
1 . 2 The Problem 
In order to modernise the agricultural sector in general and to achieve 
foodgrain self-sufficiency In particular , substantial financial investment 
is needed In this sector . By any measure Bangladesh is a capital Ipoor l 
country and more importantly capital lS much more scarce in the rural sector 
than in the other sectors of the economy . Because an overwhelming majority 
of the farming households are small farmers (about 89 percent of the farming 
households are below 5 acres of operational holding, see Table 2.3) and 
their income from agricultural operations is so meagre that they cannot under-
take any profitable investment on the farm. As a result the productivity 
of this sector has remained stagnant over the last few decades . Therefore 
any meaningful development of this sector depends entirely upon the millions 
of small farming households who are directly engaged in agricultural 
production . There is vast potential for increasing agricultural out-
put , including output from the small farm sector . This potential if harnessed 
properly would be able to provide the marginal addition to food output 
needed to keep pace with population growth over the next several decades. 
The advent of new seed-fertilizer- water based technology (popularly 
known as HYV technology) has opened up a new horizon in the land scarce and 
labour surplus economy of Bangladesh. Tn a recent study by the World Bank 
it has been ointed out that ' by changing the inputs, alone, that is to say, 
to double the output , if irrigation were practiced to the fullest extent, 
ouLLJu would 0' l ccoled , while wiLh fudhcr (1c1<1it ion of (lrainaqc (10(1 floo(1 
control , it would be possible to quadruple the output l rcited in Paaland 
and Parkinson , 1976 , p . 53J. This cleclrly indiccJLe~ l:.l1cJL Lllc ncw Lccllrlol()(Jic~j 
of foodgrain production appear to provide the basis for the people of the 
country to regain an overall balance between population and domestic grain 
. 1 productlon . 
To realize this potential , farmers , especially the small and marginal 
6 
farmers requ i re external financial assistance to purchase new seeds , fertilizers, 
pesticides and to hire more labour for improved tillage and land preparation. 
In other words , working capital requirements for HYV cultivation are much 
higher than for traditional local varieties . Field data on costs and returns 
actually being realized by farmers are limited and often not systematically 
obtained . However Table 1 . 2 . 1 provide some indication of the costs and 
returns of the local and HYV varieties . 
TABLE 1 . 2 .1 
COMPARATIVE COSTS AND RETURNS FROM TRADITIONAL VARIETY AND 
HVY T . AMAN VARIETIES , 1976 
Cost 
Labour 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
TOTAL 
Income : 
Production (maund) * 
Value** 
Farmer ' s margln 
* One maund = 37 k0 . 
** TK70 per 1l1clUIlC.l 
(Taka per acre ) 
Traditional varieties 
424 
68 
53 
8 
553 
15 
1050 
497 
Source : Agricultural Credit Study Project Report , 1978. 
HYV varieties 
704 
48 
105 
48 
905 
35 
2450 
1545 
1 On experimental stations, Bangladesh has produced prize winning dwarf rice 
varieties which have yielded up to 8 tons per acre - compared with the 
average national yield of about 0.5 tons per acre [Economist, Intelligence 
Unit Ltd . 1980 J . 
7 
From Table 1 . 2 . 1 it appears that the farmer ' s margln from the HYV varieties 
is more than 300 percent higher than the traditional local varieties and in 
terms o f productivity , it is more than 200 percent higher . In spite of such 
tremendous productivity gains from the HYV varieties, the rate of adoption 
of this new technology so far , has not been very satisfactory as can be seen 
from Table 1 . 2 . 2 . 
TABLE 1 . 2 . 2 
ACREAGE OF RICE BY VARIETIES IN BANDLADESH 
Area In million acres Percen tage of total acreage 
Year 
under HYV 
Local HYV Total 
1970- 71 23 . 35 1 . 13 24 . 48 4 . 7 
1971-72 21 . 43 1. 54 22 . 97 6 . 7 
1972 - 73 21 . 16 2 . 63 23 . 79 11 . 1 
1973- 74 20 . 58 3 . 82 24 . 40 15.7 
1974- 75 20 . 63 3 . 56 24 . 19 14 . 8 
1975 - 76 2 1. 69 3 . 84 25 . 53 15 . 1 
19 76-7 7 21 . 25 3 . 16 24 . 41 13 . 0 
Source : Development statistics of Bangladesh Agriculture, 1978 
From Table 1 . 2 . 2 it appears that the HYV acreage which was 1 . 13 million acres 
in 1970- 71 has increased to 3 . 16 million acres in 1976- 77 , which is about 13 
percent of the gross cropped area . 
One of the reasons for the slow diffusion of HYV is the limited 
participation of small farmers due to their lack of financial resources 
(either owned or borrowed) . This limits their ability to undertake on - farm 
investmen s or use modern in uts to the same extent as large farmers . Moreover, 
small farmers are more vulnerable to risk and hence more cautious about 
innovations of uncertain profitability. As a result the benefits of IIYV, so 
far , have been reaped mainly by the few big and educated farmers who have 
sufficient c pital and access to institutional credit [Bose , S . R., 19741· 
But available information from mlcro studies indicate that with adequate 
access to basic inputs (such as credit) the small farmers are fully capable 
of increasing productivity as high as those of large farmers and frequently 
higher . 
Considering the importance of small farmers and their contribution to 
8 
the total foodgrain production , the government in recent years has undertaken 
a number of steps for their greater participation in the overall foodgrain 
production of the country . The most recent attempt in this field is the 
TKIOOO million Special Agricultural Credit Programme launched in early 
February 1977 . The programme is mainly designed to serve the small, marginal 
farmers and share croppers by providing credit from the institutional sources. 
1 . 3 Background and Objective of the Study 
As mentioned in the preceding discussions, In order to lncrease the 
flow of institutional credit in the agricultural sector, the government has 
launched a TKIOOO million Special Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP) from 
February 1977 . The main objective of this programme is to provide credit 
facilities to the small , marginal farmers and share-croppers by simplifying 
the previous rigid terms and conditions associated with institutional sources 
of credit . with a view to evaluating the performance of the programme , the 
Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of the Country) conducted a survey covering 15 
districts of the country (out of 19 districts), one year after launching 
the programme . In the survey, information was collected simultaneously from 
those households who had participated in the programme and those who did not 
participate in the programme . A report (mainly based on tabular analysis) 
has been submitted to the 13ank, with respect to those who parlicipClLed in 
the programme by the study team l volved in the Survey . But the character-
is tics of lhe responden ts who did no t tClke pClr t in t1 e proyrClTTUT1e hcls remclined 
unanalysed . This unfinished task is the subject matter of this dissertation . 
Therefore , the maln objective of this study is to analyse the 
characteristics of those respondents who did not participate in the Special 
Agricultural Credit Programme and to compare this result with the report 
concernlng those who did participate in the programme . It is hoped the 
9 
results of both the study based on ' dual ' and primal ' Survey will throw some 
light on the actual performance of the programme with respect to its stated 
objective . 
Another objective of this study (which is somewhat indirect) lS to 
analyse the nature of demand for credit among the farming households who did 
not participate in the programme . The demand for credit is a much more 
complex issue than the supply of credit , because the demander of credit lS 
not a homogeneous farming unit; it varies according to size of the 
farming unit, tenurial status of a farmer and regional differences. For the 
successful implementation of any credit programme, therefore, the demand 
aspect is very important . It is hoped that our analyses of demand for credit 
among the farming households will provide some new thoughts for further 
research in this matter. 
1 . 4 Outline of the Study 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters including the introduction . 
Chapter 2 comprlses two sections : the first one concentrates on the role of 
credit in agricultural development and the second section of this chapter 
deals with the nature of demand for credit among the farming households. 
Chupter 3 examines the rural financial market and its various components 
regarding the supply of credit to the farming sector . 
Ch<.lpLer 4 is concerned with the methouolo9Y o[ the survey <.lnd the nLlture 
of the data collected and its limitation while Chapter 5 deals with the 
proposed hypoth ses and the techniques of analysis adopted to test those 
hypotheses . 
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Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of the analyses and finally 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusion , implications and possible recommendations 
from the overall analyses . 
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Clll\PTEH 2 
CREDIT IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOP lENT 
2 . 1 Introduction 
Agricultural credit has been considered as an important component of 
the strategies for development in the agricultural sector of less developed 
countries . This is considered especially important for small farmers who 
are poor and lack capital for farm production . Lack of capital is 
considered to be one of the bottlenecks to the successful development of 
agriculture and the economy as a whole . The availability of capital will 
pave the way for exploiting existing resources more efficiently so as to 
lncrease production, thereby creating additional employment opportunities 
for the millions of farmers who are landle ss and n ed r l an d le ss . I n what f ol l ows 
the role of credit as conceived by economists and policy makers in general and 
its relevance to the small farmers in particular for modernising a g riculture 
and increasing farm income will be reviewed as a background for an understanding 
of the context of this specifi c study . 
2.1 . 1 The Role of Credit in Traditional Agri c ulture 
According to some economists , in traditional agriculture capital is 
not a significant constraint on the output of small farmers. The main 
proponent of this view is T . W. Schultz . lIe has argued that many farmers 
in less developed countries have been subject to a set of preferences for 
acqulrlng and holding wealth and to a state of art which has remained 
virtually constant for generations . As a consequence they have long 
attained a type of stationary equilibrium characterised by the efficient 
use of the given agricultural factors of produc-tion at the disposal of 
ea.ch farmer . Since [LlrlnCrS .::tre bound by tr.::tdi tiol1t.ll a <J r i c ul ture : 
" The marginal rate of return to investment in agricultural 
factors of the type which farmers have long been usinq is 
low, so low that there is little or no inc entive to s a ve 
and invest" (Schultz, 1964, p . S) . 
In other words there lS no incentive to seek exte rnal f ina n c i a l a ss i s t ance 
for farm p roduc tion . 
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Another characteristic of a traditional agriculture according to him , 
1S that 
"there are comparatively few significant inefficiencies in 
the allocation of the factors of production in traditional 
agriculture" (Schultz, 1964, p.37). 
The above assertion does not necessarily mean that there is little need 
for external finance in l ess developed countries . Schultz himself, of 
course , recognised that the economic attributes of traditional agriculture 
are not common in all poor communities, since many of them have been 
undergoing changes to which they have :1ad no tim~ to fully adjust . Such changes 
of economic factors are always taking place through infrastructural develop-
ments such as the construction of new large darns, new roads, irrigation 
facilities or the negative effects of natural calamities. As a result any 
poor community which is adjusting its production to such changes are excluded 
from traditional agriculture to which the ef fi c i e nt but poor 
hypothesis applies . Since these disturbances are continuously occurr1ng 1n 
rural areas they cause considerable diversity among farmers , for whom , 
therefore, access to credit plays an important role in increasing aggregate 
production (Gonzale z -Vega , 1976). 
Following the Schultzian line of argument , a similar V1ew 1S also 
expressed by the AID's 20-volume survey. The conclusion of this is that 
scarcity of credit may not at present be an important constraint on increasing 
production using traditional methods (U.S.A.I.D. 1973). In another report 
it was held that in a situation characterised by traditional technology, 
farmers over time will acquire the appropriate amount of capital so that credit, 
especially production credit will not generally be an important factor except 
1n periods of unexpected crises (~\1orld Bo..nk , 1975). 
In view of the above , in order to understand the proper role of credit 
1n traditional agr i culture , it is essential to consider the nature of the 
production process in agriculture and of the whole set of financial problems 
faced especially by the small farmer in such a process . According to 
ellor 
" in a traditional agri c ulture p roblems 9f finance and c r edit arlse 
in large part from a seasonal cycle of production which is super-
imposed on a largely non-seasonal or steady pattern of total 
consumption . The production from agriculture normally comes at 
one or few concentrated periods 01- harvest , while consumption 
occurs relatively steadily throughout the year . Even production 
in])u s tend to be required e ither s t eadily throughout the year 
or at concentrated periods at times other than at harvest . 
Th~s provis i on for consumption and p roduction inputs requires 
either C1. savinq process from the ]JLtst hC1.rvest or credit borrowe d 
againsL a f uture harvest " (Mellor , 196G p . 310) 
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This type of production process naturally increases the d emand for 
credit especially to the small and marginal farmers who have less savings 
generated from their own farm. The need for credit in traditional agricul-
ture also arises, from unusual events, such as crop failure, which reduces 
the income of a particular year well below the average. For farmers who 
are close to the margin of subsistence it is difficult for them to carryon 
production without resort to borrowing from others (Mellor, 1966 p.312). 
This lends credence to the point of view expressed by Baker. According to 
him, credit. can be used as a reserve by simply not using it for borrowing. 
He assumed credit as an asset possessed by the farmer not a fund borrowed 
from a lender. The latter is simply a loan. The basic borrowing trans-
action lS an exchange by the small farme r of credit for a loan (Baker,1973). 
Therefore for a small farmer, limited access to credit du e to ' fragmented' 
financial environment (McKinnon, 1973) and the need for reserves may severely 
restrict the extent to which a farmer can exploit his existing production 
possibilities . This state o f affairs is a l so supported by a rece nt micro study I n 
India . By applying linear programming techniques the autho~found that an 
Ltd qUl te 1.1 • o[ c r cclit ill re(1sC'cl the jncollle or thc r':1nners substl1nti'llly cven 
at the prevailing state of technology (Sha rma and Prasad, 1971). 
In SUllllnl1ry, it C;1n b l 1:"qued thClt the c1cmond [or proc1uc tion c r edi t in 
traditional agriculture arlses not b ecause of traditiona l technology but 
because of the s easonal nature of the p roduct i on process . This demand for 
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credit is generally higher for the small farmer as compared with medium and 
large farmers . Moreover , several empirical studies in Bangladesh and India 
also indicate the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. 
(Hossain , 1974 , Saini , 1979 , Khusro , 19 7 3 , Rao, 1967) . As a result credit 
requirment per acre lS likely to be higher on small farms in comparison to 
medium and large farms . Nevertheless , one cannot help thinking that credit 
. 
starvation of the small - farm sector symtomises a vicious circle . The sector 
lS considered unproductive and therefore sufficient investment is not made 
In it . But it remalns unproductive because sufficient investment is not 
made In it in spite of the fact that substantial productivity and profitability 
potential exists and remalns unexploited (Krishna , 1979). 
2 . 1 . 2 Role of Credi-t in Modernizing Agriculture 
In the foregoing discussion the i mportan ce of cre dit in tradition a l agrl-
c ul ture has b e en alluded to . What role does credit play in modernizing 
traditional agriculture? It is generally held that with the introduction of 
modern technology , credit assumes a very important role in increasing 
productivity and especially in the process of adoption of new technology 
consisting of high- yielding variety (HYV) seeds , fertilizer, irrigation water, 
pesticides , improved implements, etc . The argument goes like this: Slnce 
the poor farmer ' s financing from current savings the whole of the balanced 
investment needed to adopt the new technology (HYV) is inadequate, an access 
to credit is likely to be necessary and without this access, the investment 
strategy sharply biases toward marginal variations within the traditional 
technology (lcKinnon , 1973) . Several other economists have also expressed a 
similar view . Credit is a key element in the modernization of a griculture 
( osher , 1966 , Donald 1976, Rice 1973) . Credit with scientific knowledge 
has in fact been described as the key element in Ind i an gr i c ulture and not 
land and labour (Rao , C . H. H. 1970) . 
Historical experience and the recent breakthroughs associated with the 
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HYV technology demonstrate that the potential for increasing farm output 
is very great . In a recent study it was revealed that yield increases of 
the order of 100 per cent to 200 per cent above the present levels are 
feasible with the modern seed-water-fertilizer technology . The net marginal 
return to fertilizer alone has been estimated to be 7 to 15 times the 
marginal cost in Bangladesh and 2 to 4 times in India (Singh, 1978). 
clearly indicates that with proper access to credit, small farmers can 
increase their present level of production substantially. 
This 
Several studies have been conducted to ascertain the role of credit In 
ralslng agricultural production through the adoption of new technology. 
In a study of farms in Rajasthan , it was revealed that new technology and 
credit used in combination increased lncomes In all sizes of farms by about 
73 per cent (Agarawal and Kumarwat, 1974) . In another study in west 
Godavari district of India shows that credit helped all size categories of 
farmers but small farms benefited more. Shor"tage of capital contrib-
uted heavily to the low adoption of HYV technology (Subrarnanyam and Patel, 
1973) . A simil~r study in n~ng1~desh ~1so rev ~led th~t shortnge of c~pitn1 
was the most binding constraint to exploiting the available resources for 
crop production by the small farmers . The author concludes that an 
adequate supply of formal credit could contribute substantially to ralslng 
cropplng intensities and change in the crop mixes of the farms In favour of 
adoption of HYV crops (Raquib, 1977) . 
Similarly , lack of access to credit has also been cited by several 
studies as a reason why small farmers delayed In the adopt ion of the new 
technology of the qreen revolution (KhLln 1975, Nnseem 1975, Schulter 1973). 
The reason why credit has been important in the adoption of HYV is that these 
varieties are higilly responsive to the higher l evel of wnter and fertilizer 
inputs as compared with traditional varieties. Moreover, HYV cultivation 
also requi 'more labour input as compnred with traditionnl vnrieties 
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(Ahmed 1980) . In other words the shift ~n the production function as a 
result of technological change increases the demand for the purchased inputs 
including hired labour more rapidly than the demand for factors of production 
directly supplied by farmer and his family . In order to purchase these 
additional inputs , the farmer, especially the small farmer, needs greater 
access to formal credit. This view has been supported by several studies 
using farm level data . Naseem's study of small farmers in the Sahiwal 
district of Pakis·tan revealed that farmers considered lack of capital for 
purchase of variable inputs such as seeds , fertilizer and pesticides and 
incurring some capital costs such as installing a tubewell as their main 
constraint (Naseem, 1973) . A similar study by Schulter in the Surat 
district of India found that credit plays an important role in adaption when 
small farmers begin to adapt new varieties , and large farmers expand their 
acreage under the new varieties beyond the initial trial stage. The author 
concluded that 
"in areas of technological change, small farmers will demand 
credit once the risk and profitability of the innovation have 
been established. It is in these areas that no effort should 
be spared to improve management practices , to prevent institut-
ional constraints on the supply of credit to small farmers, as 
these constraints may inhibit adoption ." (Schulter, 1973 p. 28). 
On the other hand several studies also reported adoption of new 
technology in the absence of credit . Desai and Desai's study in Baroda 
district of India indicated that the existing availability of credit plus 
farmers ' own funds was not inadequate to enable them to adopt new technology. 
(Desai and Desai , 1970) . A similar study in the Philippines revealed that 
credit was not a crucial limiting factor among the small farmers to farm 
investment . (Tagumpay Castillo , 1968) . 
In a study based on still earlier fieldwork by Penny in North Sumatra, 
Indonesia , revealed that in the new settlements where there are no landlords 
or money lenders , farmers : 
"earn incomes that are ample to financ,e the purchase of 
fertilizer, new tools, improved seeds and other modern 
inputs if they want to . " 
He concluded that 
"clearly there is no need to provide these farmers with 
credit to get development underway . " (Penny, 1968 p.37). 
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The above conflicting evidence suggests that the importance of credit 
1S not universal . Indeed it is likely that the need for credit varies from 
country to country , reg10n to region, district tn district and even village 
to village . Moreover , the need for credit also varies according to farm 
slze . Therefore , agricultural credit 1S a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for agricultural development . It is one of the many factors 
playing a part in the complicated process of stepping up agricultural 
production (F . A. O., 1965) . In other words transformation of traditional 
agriculture does not simply involve making available a new improved technology 
and credit to the rational farmer but structural obstacles may often play 
an important role . 
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2 . 2 Nature of Demand for Credit by Farm Size 
2 . 2.1 Nature of the Problem 
Most of the analytical literature on agricultural credit has been 
concerned with the supply aspect . These studies mainly examine the adequacy, 
or otherwise , of the volume, composition and distribution of credit from the 
lender ' s point of view . There is only a limited literature devoted to the 
demand for credit , but these studies do not analyse the true nature of 
demand because the aggregation of farm size, into total demand for credit lS 
a misleading simplification . (Lipton , 1976 ). 
In order to analyse the demand for credit , it should be remembered that 
the farming community is not homogeneous . The nature of demand for credit 
is expected to vary with the size and asset structure and the economic flows 
managed by different individuals or fa~ws . (Von Pischke , 1978, Belshaw,1963). 
In other words , the demand for credit in farming sectors is not uniform or 
constant but rather uneven in different parts of the year. Moreover, in a 
good harvest year the demand for production credit will be less as compared 
to a bad harvest year . Since the nature of the demand for credit is a subtle 
and complex issue, it is more realistic to analyse demand according to farm 
Slze rather than for an aggregated farm sector. 
The first step is to specify clearly who needs' credit. In a country 
like Bangladesh the majority of the poor reside in rural areas, their main 
occupation is agriculture and they are predominantly small farmers; some 
own land , but most are tenants with cultivating holdings of less than 5 acres 
(2 hectares), or landless . The overall structure of the rural sector in 
Bangladesh can be seen from Table 2 . 1 
From Table 2 . 1 it appears that there are 6 .1 million cultivating farm 
households which is about 51 . 7 per cent of the total rural households and 
the remaining 48 . 3 per cent is landless . Therefore, in order to analyse the 
demand for credit , we need to investigate the nature and structure of those 
TABLE 2.1 
AGRARIAN PROFILES OF BANGLADESH 
Year 
Rural population 
No . of households 
Cultivating households 
Cultivating households 
with less than 5 acres 
of operational holdings 
Cultivating households 
with some form of tenancy 
Landless households 
(Fig . in Million) 
1961 
52 . 4 
8.8 
6.0 
N.A . 
N. A . 
N.A . 
Notes : N. A. = Not available 
Source: Singh , 1979. 
1967 
61 . 6 
9 . 9 
6.9 
N. A. 
N. A. 
N.A. 
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1977 
69.0 
11.8 
6.1 
5.1 
2.1 
5.7 
6 . 1 million households who are engaged in agricultural production. The 
problems of landless households are beyond the scope of production credit and 
their problem shall be dealt with separately. 
2 . 2 . 2 Structure and Pattern of Cultivating Households 
Any useful discussion relating to the demand for credit must consider 
how much land an . individual or farm controls, because land is one of the most 
important factors of production without which talking of production credit is 
meaningless . But ownership of land should not be the only criterion on the 
basis of which the credit worthiness of an individual farmer or farm should 
be judged, because varlOUS forms of tenural arrangements are prevalent in 
rural areas . Three broad categories such as owner farm , owner - cum-tenant 
farm and tenant farms can be identified from Table 2 . 2 . 
TABLE 2.2 
STRUCTURE AND PATTERN OF LAND TENURE 
IN BANGLADESH 
Average Size of farms (ac r es) Percentage of farms 
Type of Tenancy 1 
1960 1968 1974 1960 1968 1974 
Owner farms 3.1 2.7 2.3 61 66 67 
Owner-cum-Tenant 
farms 4.3 4.0 4.1 37 30 27 
Tenant farms 2.4 3.0 2 .4 2 4 6 
Total 3.5 3.2 2.8 100 100 100 
Source : (i) Government of Pakistan, Agricultural Census Report, 1960. 
(ii) Government of East Pakistan , Bureau of Statistics, Master 
Survey , 1968. 
(iii) Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies Survey, 1974 
(as quoted by Alamgir , M. , 1975) . 
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Table 2.2 indicates that owner farms accounted for 67 per cent, owner-cum-
tenant 27 ~er cent and pure tenant 6 per cent respectively in 1974 . Because 
of this diversity in tenurial arrangements , any analysis regarding the demand 
for credit on the basis of ownership of land alone would not be realistic. 
Instead it lS the operational ho l ding of the farming households which can 
serve as a useful criterion for jUdging the credit worthiness of farm house-
holds. Furthermore , the trends evident in Table 2 . 2 suggest important 
changes In the structure of demand for credit. 
Table 2 . 3 shows the size distribution of operational land holding In 
Bangl adesh . 
1 Data for 1974 are taken from a survey of eight villages carried out 
by BIDS in 1974 . 
Size In Acres 
Under 0 . 5 
0 . 5 - 1 . 0 
1 . 0 - 2 . 5 
2 . 5 - 5 . 0 
5 . 0 - 7 . 5 
7 . 5 12 . 5 
1 2 . 5 and above 
TABLE 2 . 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATED FARMS AND 
FARM AREA IN BANGLADESH 
1960 
13 
11 
27 
26 
12 
7 
4 
Farms (%) 
1968 
12 
13 
32 
26 
9 
5 
3 
1974 1960 
32 1 
9 2 
25 13 
23 26 
7 19 
3 19 
1 20 
Source : As Table 2 . 2 
l\r~a (%) 
1968 1974 
1 2 
3 3 
17 19 
30 33 
18 19 
15 13 
16 11 
From Table-2 . 3 i t can be observed that 88 per cent of the farms are less 
than 5 acres (about 2 hectares) whereas they comprised only 58 per cent of 
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the area in 1974 . From the same table it can be observed that 32 per cent 
of the farms are under half an acre in size and accounted for only 2 per cent 
of the total farm area in 1974 as compared with 13 per cent and 1 per cent 
respectively in 1960 . 
Since the demand for credit is likely to vary according to farm Slze, 
it is important to define in more detail the various size groups . Farm 
size is frequently defined in terms of either physical size or economlC Slze 
or both, al lloug h physical size alone is no longer accepted as a useful 
criterion in defining farm size (Miracle, 1973). On the other hand, it is 
also difficult to define farm Slze on the basis of economic viability because 
of regional variation and other factors . However, if the regional variation 
with respect to rainfall , soil fertility, irrigation and other factors is 
'2.2 
taken into consideration , five broad categories of farm households can be 
defined In Bangladesh on the basis of phys~cal and economic potential. 
(Singh, 1979). 
(i) 1 Near landless - those with less than one acre (.4 hectares) of 
operated area . The present holdings of this group of farmers are too 
small to provide a subsistence standard of living even a llowing for a 
productivity increase through HYV technology in the future. They are 
landless in the sense that their livelihood depends mainly on rural wage 
income and other non-farm employment which range s from 40 to 60 per cent 
of their total source of income (Memorandum , 1978 ). This group account 
for 41 per cent of the cultivated holdings but only 5 per cent of the 
cultivated area. 
(ii) Marginal farmers - those with between I and 2.5 acres (.4 to 1 hectare ) 
of operated area, whose holdings are currently inadequate to provide a 
minimum subsistence living but through improved cultivation their income 
could be increased substantially and could provide a reasonable standard of 
living in the future. Marginal farmers account for 25 pe r cent of the 
cultivated holdings and 19 per cent of the cultivated area. 
(iii) Small farmers - those with between 2 .5 and 5 acres (1-2 hectares) of 
operated area . This group of farmers with their present holdings can earn 
a minimum standard of living but future productivity increases could 
definitely provide a decent living. Small farmers accounted for 22 per cent 
of the cultivated holdings and 19 per cent of c ultivated area . 
(iv) Medium Farmers - those with b etween 5 and 7.5 acres (2- 3 hectares ) 
whose present holding is quite sufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living and th ir re source base offers further potential for adding to 
lDcome through improved cultivation. Usually, this group of farmers has 
no credit problem , but they need long - term credit [or further development . 
Medium farm rs a count for 7 per cent of cultivated holdings and 19 per cent 
1 It is contend d that below a certain size (for example, 1 . S 
Bangladesh), output per acre declines as the farm size goes 
small farms not only do not provide adequate employment but 
provide scope for the application of modern inputs (Islam, 
acres In 
down . Very 
also do not 
. 1974) . 
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of the cultivated area . 
(v) Large farmers - those with 7.S acres and above (3 hectares and above). 
This group of farmers are in an enviable position 1n the rural sector. 
Their present level of 1ncome 1S quite sufficient to undertake any further 
investment without outside assistance. Large farmers account for 4 per 
cent of operational holdings and 24 per cent of cultivated area. Each of 
the abovementioned groups of farmers are shown in Diagram 1. 
DIAGRAM 1 
Medi wn 
farms 
Small farms 
Marg i na l farms 
Ncar Landless 
Viable for medium and 
long-term credit 
Potentially viable for 
production credit 
Not viable for production 
credit 
As mentioned above, 1n order to determine the nature of the d ella nd for credit 
among the farming population, the size of the operational holdings 1S of crucia l 
importance . However , Slze and structure of operational holdings h a s been 
undergoing changes over time due to increasing rate of population gr0wth 
which is also affecting the nature of the demand for credit in the country. 
Figure 1 shows the inequality 1n the distribution of operationa l holdings of 
the two periods 1961 and 1 ()74 1n Bang ladesh. 
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FIG . :2.1 LORENZ CURVE 
I EQUALITY IN THE OPERATIONAL HOLDING 
OF BANGLADESH 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of Farms 
From Fig2.1 it can be observed that the degree of concentration of operation-
al holding has increased further in 1974 as compared with the period of 1960. 
Moreover the distribution of operational holdings as measur ed by the Gini 
co- efficient whic h was . 49 in 1960 increase d to . 57 in 1974. Therefore, 
due to a change in the distribution of operational holding, the magnitude 
of the demand for production credit lS likely to change. \'Je now turn to 
examlne the implications of this structure of land holding for the demand 
for credit . 
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2 . 3.1 Demand for Credit 
Following the theory of inter-temporal choice developed by Fisher and 
elaborated by Hirshleifer (Hirshleifer, 1970), the demand for credit of an 
individual farmer is influenced by the following factors: [Gonzalez-Vega,1976] 
(i) Productive opportunity of a farmer; 
(ii) The initial endowment of a farmer; 
(iii) The farmer ' s objective function; 
(iv) The farmer ' s access to alternative sources of credit; 
(v) The cost of borrowing, in addition to the rates of interest; 
(vi) The farmer ' s attitude towards risk and the degree of uncertainty; 
and (vi i) The farmer ' s repayment discipline. 
The size of the operational farm unit is of crucial importance to each 
of these factors. 
The productive opportunity of a marginal farmer represents the range of 
alternative combinations of output attainable by utilizing the resources 
under his ~ornrnand , which consists of land, family l abour , family implements, 
ferti lity of the holding, access to market and experience etc. Similarly, 
at the beginning of the production period every farmer possesses an initial 
endowment which includes farm produced crops and seeds as well as cash. 
The size of the farmers initial endowment is a function of his productive 
opportunity . 
Therefore, assumlng a glven family Slze, it can be stated that the 
greater the farmer ' s productive opportunity, ceteris paribus, the more 
credit he demands. On the other hand , the greater the farmer ' s initial 
endowment , ce teris ptlribus , the less ered it he c1em<:mc1s (Gonz a le z -Ve<]<l , 1976) . 
Following this argument the credit requirement of a marginal farmer can be 
stated by u simple equation : 
Cr = Ie - In 
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where , Cr represents the amount of credit ~equired, 
Ie represents the value of the initial endowment, 
In represents the value of additional inputs required to achieve 
a given increase in output. 
In order to estimate the input requirements (In) we would have to know 
the shape of the production function of a marginal farmer. ~ssuming that 
he is on a production function common to all farmers taken together, it can 
then be argued that the marginal farmer's low initial endowment (Ie), would 
not permit both purchasing the required inputs as well as the consumption 
requirements of the family . Thus the demand for credit of a marginal farmer 
lS a composite demand , i . e . demand for production and consumption expenses. 
There is a tendency among policy makers to exclude the consumption 
~ 
credit needs of marginal farmers. The argument being that consumption 
credit is unproductive. But to be more realistic 
"consider a farmer who has sown some land. He has paid all 
the inputs including the hired labour. He has, however, not 
paid anything to family labour. Family labour will be paid 
at harvest. The total net return is the total wage payment 
to the farmer and his family . They , however, have to 
survive physically in the intervening three to four months 
between sowing and harvesting. They have to be fed and 
clothed . The only way out is a loan from somebody or some 
agency. This loan is like an advance wage payment to family 
labour which will be adjusted at harvest time. Again it may 
be that a part of the consumption loan was in fact incurred 
for payment to hired labour in kind, mostly meals during the 
work day". (Asaduzzman and Hossain , 1974). v 
A similar argument is also put forward by Lipton. According to him v 
"Zlny s nsiblc person , given u 10Zln, first sees thZlt his family 
docs not starve ; second, uses the residual [or high priority 
(high return) outlays; and only then considers what profitable 
investment (e. (:.1 . on the farm ) he CL'l.n make . To lend without 
rc'q.,rd to the' fi 1St" t"wn n('('(ls, whi 1 c ryj nq 10.,l1S l"o t h(, thi rcl , 
is to repel the sensible, unless they lie about how they use th~ 
sums borrowed ." (Lipton, 1976 p . 547). 
In he light of th ubove urgumcnt.s it lS postulutec1 that the demand 
for consumption credit of a marginal farmer lS inelastic whereas the demand 
[or product'on credit lS less inelastic. This lS ShOWll in l" ig. ~ . 2 , 
Interest 
Rate 
(a) 
r 
r 1 --------
FIG. 2.2 
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In Fig. 2 . 2(a) and (b) the horizontal and vertical axes represent the 
quantity of credit demanded and rate of interest respectively. 
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In Fig . 2 . 2 (a), Dc represents the consumption demand curve of a marginal 
farmer . If the rate of interest increases from r to r
l
, the proportionate 
change in the quantity demanded is smaller. In other words, a change in the 
rate of interest does not affect very much the consumption demand for credit 
of a marginal farmer . In Fi CJ . 2 . 2 (b) Dp rep rc\s e nts the product ion demand 
curve . In this case, if the interest rate rises from r to r
l
, the change 
in the quantity demanded Q, is larger . A recent micro study in India Also 
supports the above hypothesis (Kumar , Joshi and Muralidharan, 1978). 
The ll utho ~s by llc10ptinq ,1 restricted profit function esbmlltec1 Llw C1Clll i lll Cl 
for credit of a group of marginal farmers of a district in Western Uttar 
Pradesh . Their findings reveal that the demand for credit by the marginal 
farmers (half hectare) is inelastic with respect to the rate of interest but 
highly elastic with respect to prices of both inputs and outputs . 
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2.3 . 2 Demand for Credit of a Small Farmer 
The demand for credit of a small farmer 1S also a composite demand, 
1 . e . a demand for consumption as well as for production purposes. But 
unlike marginal farmers their demand for consumption credit 1S not inelastic. 
The reason 1S that as compared with marginal farmers, small farmers possess 
more initial endowment as well as productive opportunity in terms of land. 
They can meet a larger amount of consumption requirements from their own 
produce . But their position 1S very vulnerable in the sense that in a bad 
year , due to drought or flood, their initial endo~ent may be wiped out and 
they become just like a marginal farmer. However, in general, the demand 
for credit of a small farmer is less inelastic following good but inelastic 
after bad years . This situation is shown in Fig. 2.3. 
FIG . 2 . 3 
CREDIT DEMAND CURVE FOR A SMALL FARMER 
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In Fig . 2 . 3, Dg represents the credit de~and curve of a small farmer In a 
normal year and Db after bad year. In a normal year if the rate of 
interest r increases to r l , the quantity of credit demanded decreases 
more than proportionately than the rise in the rate of interest. But after 
a bad year , a rise in the rate of interest from r to r l , the quantity of 
credit demanded decreases less than proportionately than the rise in the 
rate of interest . In other words, after a bad year small farmers demand 
for credit is inelastic , i.e . they need credit for both consumption and 
produ ction purposes . 
2 . 3 . 4 Demand for Credit of Medium and Large Farmers 
The demand for credit of a medium or large farmer lS not a composite 
demand . In other words , they have no need to borrow for family consumption 
purposes . Although medium and large farmers possess greater productive 
opportunities in terms of land , technology and human and physical capital, 
they a l so possess a much larger initial endowment than the marginal and 
smal l farmers . Since these two factors affect the demand for credit in 
different directions , at a given interest rate, the marginal and small 
farmers may demand a larger loan than the medium and large farmer 
(Gonzalez-Vega , 1976) . Therefore, it can be postulated that the demand 
for production credit of medium and large farmers is highly elastic. The 
nature of their demand curve is shown in Fig. 2 . 4. 
FIG 2 - 4 
CREDIT DEMAND CURVE FOR A MEDIUM AND LARGE FARMER 
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Fig . 2 . 4 shows that at an interest rate r , the quantity demanded would 
be Q but if the interest rate increases to r l , the quantity demanded would 
decrease to Ql which is proportionally more than the increase in interest 
rate . 
In essence the nature of demand for credit analysed above indicates 
that the marginal and small farmers need more credit as compared with 
medium and large farmers. This i s partly because of the demand for 
con::-.umptio ll CIS we'll oS [or proc1uction purpose's . On the other hand, 
medium and large farmers possess greater productive opportunity and initial 
endowment than the marginal and small farmers . Since endowments do not 
necessarily correspond to opportunities (McKinnon, 1973), it indicates that 
the demand for credit from medium and large farmers is not necessarily 
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greater than the demand for credit from marginal and small farmers. 
2 . 4 Access to Alternative Sources of Credit 
The demand for production credit is also influenced by the access to 
alternativ sources of credit that each particular borrower has. 
As already mentioned , the rural financial market in Bangladesh 1S 
fragmented. As a resulL different borrowers have to pay 
different rates of interest depending on their economic and social position 
in society . One of the reasons for the inelastic demand for credit of 
marginal and small farmers 1S that they have got few alternative sources 
from which they can borrow In order to meet their consumption and production 
requirements; they generally depend on village money-lenders and friends 
illld relatives. Although institutional sources meet a small proportion of 
their needs , these institutions hardly ever lend for consumption purposes. 
As a result the marginal and small farmers easily fall back on a particular 
l ende r , who usually charges higher interest rates, which ultimately reduce s the 
small farmer ' s income. 
However, medium and large farmers have a greater access to different 
types of credit source and consequently their demand for credit lS 
more lastic. Moreover , medium and large farmers also possess greater 
economic and political power so that they can easily manipulate the subsidis-
ed credit from institutional sources. 
The impact of alternative sources of credit on the elasticity of the 
demand for credit for different size groups of farmers is represented In 
Fig . 2 . S. In case (a), it is assumed that medium and large farmers can 
obL in any Z1111 unt of credit [rom institutiol1LlI sources uS well Z1S [rom other 
-
sources , at a given interest rate of r. In this situation their demand curve 
for credit will be completely horizontal at the level of the given interest 
rate r . Similarly, in case (b) it is assumed that a marginal and a small 
farmer can get a limited amount of loan from a particular lender which is 
smaller than the loan which they demand at that rate . In such a situation their 
FIG. 2.5 
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demand for credit even at a higher rate of interest will be the same. The 
demand for credit In case of (a) and (b) is shown by the solid portion of 
whereas in case (b) it is highly inelastic . 
2 . 5 Cost of Borrowing 
The cost of borrowing lS also an important factor which influences 
the demand for credit from the formal sources . The borrowing costs generally 
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include three separate elements; the nominal rate of interest (NI), 
additional loan transaction costs incurred by the borrower (TC) , and changes 
in the purchasing power of money over the loan period (~P). The expected 
* borrowing costs (BC ) likely to be incurred by a borrower when making a 
loan would equal to NI + TC - ~P . (Adams and Nehman, 1979). 
In order to obtain a loan from the formal sources the farmer has to 
incur several costs in addition to the rate of interest. The borrower's 
non- interest costs ' includes application fees , travelling expenses , 
entertaining someone before a loan appl i cation is formally reviewed, bribes 
and in many cases the largest and most important transaction costs are the 
borrower ' s time involved in the loan transaction. This cost is particularly 
important for a marginal and small farmer because they have to make several 
vis i ts to varlOUS persons including the bank in order to obtain credit. 
This becomes much more important if loan transactions take place in planting 
and harvesting periods when the opportunity cost of the borrower's time is 
substantial. 
Several empirical studies also suggest that these costs of borrowing 
tend to be more important than the rates of interest paid in the case of 
marginal and small farmers . Shahjahan ' s investigation of a sample of 
2 , 500 farmers in Bangladesh clearly indicates that the effective costs of 
borrowing per rupee of loan declines rapidly as the size of loan lncreases. 
(Shahjahan , 1968) . A recent study by Alarn in Bangladesh also found that 
the cost of borrowing is inversely related to farm size . (Alam, 1978). 
In the light of the foregoing discussions it can be argued that the 
costs of borrowing have a direct impact on the demand for credit , especially 
to the marginal and small farmer , which reduces their demand for credit. 
On the other hand , medium and large farmers with their political and social 
influence can obtain larger loans at less cost, although they require less 
credit . 
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2 . 6 Risk and Uncertainty 
In understanding the demand for credit , it is necessary to consider the 
problems of risk and uncertainty prevailing in agricultural production 
planning . Agriculture in less developed as well as in developed countries lS 
a very risky and uncertain venture and as a result both output and exp nditure 
are subject to random fluctuations even In a single production period (Long, 
1968) . This risk and uncertainty plays an important role in influencinq the 
demand for credit especially among the marginal and small farmers. 
Risk and uncertainty are intimately related to a farmer's decision-
making framework . For a farmer risk and uncertainty can arise from three 
sources . These are (i) yield variability ; (ii) cost variability; and 
(iii) product price variability. (Wharton, 1969) . A lack of perfect 
knowledge about these variations influences the role of risk and uncertainty 
in the farmer I s decision-making process . Risk is a variable which can be 
measured and predicted in quantitative manner within certain ranges or 
dispersions , whereas uncertainty is largely a SUbjective phenomenon , which 
relates to future c~pectations of outcome. Each individual producer predicts 
the future outcome by his own method and makes decisions based largely on his 
own experi ence . As a result he cannot:. determine perfectly the parameters of 
he probability distribution associated with the outcome. 
Therefore expectation of increasing risk, associated with investment, 
gives rise to risk aversion tendency among the farmers and 
"if Ll farmer is risk averse , risk acts as a friction to 
production and induces a lower level of resource use than 
would otherwise prevail ." (Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977 p.161). 
It is gene ully 11 Id. thLl t m<.1rginal and smLl ll fLlrmers Llre ,]enerLllly risk 
averse . TIl reason is that this group of farmers possess relatively low ini tial 
endowmen s which do not permit them to undertake any risky and uncertain 
venture. This tendency among them leads to capital rationing. This 
means that when farmers are faced with risk and uncertainty they prefer to 
35 
curtail their expenditure on purchased iriputs even if they h ad the opportunity 
to borrow. In such a situation each farmer makes a sUbjective discount to 
future productivity of the farm in his own way as he views the uncertainty , 
which is shown in Fig . 2 . 6 (Singh , 1964) . 
FIG . 2 . 6 
DEMAND FOR CREDI~ UNDER UNCER':L'_7)_LT~'Y 
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From Fig. 2 . 6 it CQn be observed that under certainty the marginal 
productivity curve lies above the discounted marginal product curve (MVP~ ) 
with uncertainty . The MVP " curve will differ in each individual case since 
-
it is governed by sUbjective phenomena. At a given inte rest r a t e r, he 
will borrow c apital at the point P whe re the margina l cost of borrowing is 
equal to the discounted marginal value of his product. Therefore, in case 
of unc rtainty h e will borrow OM amount of capita l wl1ereas in case of 
certain y h e could have borrowed OM~ amount of capital . It lS assumed that 
capital is available up to OM~~ at the same rate of interest r. 
In such a manner the farmer r educes his demand for credit by his own 
choice when faced with risk and uncertainty . 
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2.7 Rep yment Discipline 
Repayment discipline is an important factor which also influences the 
demand for credit, especially from the institutional sources. If a 
borrower knows that the repayment procedure of a loan is not very strict or 
he can withhold the loan repayment for quite a long time, then he would 
demand more credit. This is partly responsible for smaller share of 
institutional credi-t to marginal or small farmers because large farmers 
know very well that the loan repayment procedure is not very rigorous and 
therefore they can easily withhold the loan money which can be used for other 
purposes instead of being used simply for production purposes for which the 
amount was Lorrowed. In the case of loans through cooperative organisations , 
the medium and large farmers tend to dominate the administrative structure 
and consequently they can arrange to receive a greater amount of credit than 
small and marginal farmers . However , their repayment performance is not satis-
f actory as compared with the marginal and small farmers (Khan, A. A., 1968). 
Therefore, strict repayment discipline requires (i) procedures for 
determining the borrower's repayment capacities, including increments to 
their capacities resulting from the use of credit; (ii) refusing credit 
requests that appear excessive relative to repayment capacities ; and 
(iii) prompt action against wilful defaulters. 
In essence, it can be argued that strict repayment discipline can 
influence the demand for credit to a great extent irrespective of farm Slze. 
It can also help in productive use of credit for whic h the loan is given . 
This ch pter c an only serve as Ll ba ckdrop to the subsequent clnalysis . 
The intention was to demonstrate the complexity of the issues involved In an 
clIlLllysis of crediL requirements . ~vhcn the c1clt<l ~;eL llsed in this sLudy lS 
examined, in Chapter 4, it will be evident from the foregoing discussion that 
many crucial variables w re omitted from the survey questionnaire. Before 
turning to the data set the study n ow looks at the rural financial market in 
Bangladesh . 
CHAPTER 3 
RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET IN BANGLADESH : 
TFIP. SU PLY OF 1\GRICULTURAL CREDIT 
3 . 1 Introduction 
In the foregoing section we have depicted the role of credit in 
agricultural development as well as the nature of demand for credit 
according to farm size . We now turn to an examination of supply side 
of credit as obtaining to the rural financial market in Bangladesh . 
3 .2 Features of Rural Financial Market. 
Like most of the developing countries, the rural financial market 
In Bangladesh may be divided into two broad segments : (1) informal 
and (2) institutional . The informal segment of the market is also 
called ' unorganised ' in the sense that it operates outside the jurisdiction 
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of the Banking Companies Act. The institutional segment on the other hand, 
operates within the provlslons of the Act and consequently both the Central 
Bank and government have direct control over its activities (Desai,1979). 
Chart 1 indicates the two segments of the rural financial market in 
Bangladesh . 
The composition and operational structure of the two segments of the 
market are quite different from each other. The main characteristics 
which distingui s h the informa l sector from the institutiona l sectors can be 
described as follows: (The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee , 1931 
pp . 98 -9 9 . 
p . 58-59) 
1\11 India Rural Credit 'urvey , 1957, Ch . 2l, Narkswasdi,l963 
(a ) blending money lending with other t ypes of economl C activities ; 
(b) informa lity in dealing with borrowers; 
(c) personal contact with borrowers; 
(d) simple loan procedures; 
(e) flexibility of loan operations ; 
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(f) secrecy about financial tran~action; and 
(g) prompt serVlce . 
In Vlew of the above features, it is generally held that the informal 
segment of the rural financial market lS multi-functional in character 
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while the institutional segment is uni-functional. (Ghatak, 1976; Desai,1976). 
This means that the institutional sector only provides production or invest-
ment credit while the informal sector provides credit for a wide range of 
activities including consumption purposes . In general, the informal sector's 
instruments of financ i al intermediation are such that enable it to operate 
not only in finance but also in land, labour and commodity markets 
(Desai , 1979, Bardhan and Rudra, 1978). On the other hand, the procedures 
of institutional sources of credit are cumbersome , lengthy and have a 
tendency to gravitate towards influencial elements In the community. 
Another important feature of the rural financial market relates to the 
slze of the market. A credit market has two important size dimensions: 
(1) the volume of funds that flow through it and (2) the number of 
individuals that partic i pate in the market (Nisbet , 1973). There lS no 
a uthentic documentation based on comprehensive agricultural credit surveys 
in the country as to the relative share of informal and institutional 
sources of credit; but different studies and official estimates i ndicat e 
that the size of the informa l segment of the market is much larger tha n the 
institutional segment. This implies that the informal market plays a 
very important rol e in the rural fina ncial marke t of Ban g l a d esh . 
Th e rates of interest charged in the two segments of the marke t 
differ quite significantly. In Bang ladesh insta nces we r e f ound whe r e 
borrowers are made to pay a rate of interest rangin g from 50 pe r cent 
to 200 per cent per annum on loans supplie d by village money l enders . (Sola iman 
and Huq , 1973; Khan, 1979). On the othe r hand , the nominal rate of inter e st 
charged by the institutional a g encles range s f r om 11 per cen t to 17 ~ per cent 
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excluding non-interest costs. Moreover, . non-interest costs which the 
borrowers have to incur vary from one agency to the other because of insuff-
icient standardization in assessing collateral and the lack of co-operation of 
the agricultural credit personnel of different institutions. (Alam and Momen, 
1978). 
Finally , it is generally held that institutions providing agricultural 
credit at least implicitly have been concerned with the objectives of viability 
equity and economic efficiency of activities financed by credit (Desai,1978; 
Donald , 1976 ) while the objectives of informal lenders are purely commercial 
1 
and exploitative In nature. (Chandavarker, 1971; Bhtluuri , 1977 ; LOll Cj , 
1968) . 
In the light of the foregoing discussion it can be argued that the 
rural financial market in Bangladesh has always been fragmented and 
dualistic in nature and some of the major problems in rural finance arlse 
from this basic structure and organisation. One implication of the 
fragmented ~arket is that funds do not flow readily either between segments 
or even among borrowers within a segment. This situation can lead to: 
(1) lack of competition among lenders, leading to usurious interest rates; 
(2) an inelastic supply of funds, slowing the investment process when the 
demand for development funds is increasing rapidly and (3) the use of any 
surplus funds either for consumption and for land purchase or for other 
investments that are not related to increasing productivity . (Assault on 
Poverty , World Bank, 1975; Ahsan , 1979) . 
3 . 3 Supply of Credit : Informal Sources 
IIis oric0lly, the credit needs o[ the rur0l sec or hl1ve been met primarily 
from the informal sources . As indicated in Chart 1, the informal segment 
consists of village money lenders , landlords or well - to - do farmers , friends 
1 This does not include friends and relatives. 
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and relatives , shopkeepers, commlSSlon agents, marketing intermediaries 
and the bulk of the farm credit requirements are met by them. Attempts 
have been made from time to time to investigate the relative shares of 
informal and institutional sources of credit in Bangladesh. Two 
major com arable studiesl are the one undertaken in 1956 by the Dacca 
University Socio - Economic Survey Board and that of the Registrar of 
Co - operative Societies undertaken in 1966 . Their findings are shown 
in Table 3 . 2 . 
Year 
1956 
1966 
Source : 
TABLE 3 . 2 
SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN BANGLADESH 
(Amount in Taka) 
Average amount per 
borrower household 
Informal Inst i tutiona l 
120 39 
227 . 86 36.67 
Percentage of total credit 
Informal Institutional 
96.16 3.84 
86.14 13.86 
(i) Rural Credit and Unemployment in East Pakistan , 1956. 
(ii ) Agricultural Credit in East Pakistan , Registrar of 
Co - operative Societies , 1966 as quoted by Asaduzzman 
and Hossain , 1974. 
Tabl e 3 . 2 shows that 96 per cent of the credit requirement was met 
by the informal sources whereas institutional sources contributed 
only 4 per cent in 1956 . By 1966 , the informal sources contributed 
86 per cent and institutional sources 14 per cent respectively. 
Another important feature which was revealed by the two surveys was 
the structure of the informal segment of the market and their 
relative contribution into the supply of credit . This can be seen 
1 The first study was based on a survey conducted In four subdivisions 
of Bangladesh and the sample Slze was 3144 farm households. In the 
second study the sample size was more than 1200 farm households. 
from Table 3 . 3 
TABLE 3.3 
RELATIVE SIffiRE OF INFORMAL SOURCES OF CREDIT 
(In per cent) 
Year 
Source 1956 1966 
Friends and Relatives 56 . 56 29.7 
Money lenders 4.55 44 . 74 
Well-to-do-people 22.94 15.6 
Marketing Intermediaries 2 . 72 5.3 
Shopkeepers 10.99 0.5 
Others 2.20 4.0 
Note : Figures may not add up to 100 because of rounding errors. 
Source : As in Table 3 . 2 
From Table 3 . 3 it appears that between 1956 and 1966 , the relative 
share of agricultural money lenders increased from 5 per cent to 
45 per cent. The explanation of such a phenomenal rise lS that most 
professional money lenders in British days were Hln du s who 
migrated to India at the time of partition and during the early 
fifties. As a result there was a vacuum in the rural credit market 
which was initially filled by friends and relatives but later by some 
of the rural rich people who found it a lucrative business. Hence 
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by 1966 , the professional money lenders and well-to-do-farmers tog ether 
provided about 60 per cent of the total amount of credit. Another 
study in two areas of the country in 1969-70 also indic a tes that the 
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share of money lenders increased further as can be seen from Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 
RELATIVE SHARE OF INFORMAL SOURCES OF CREDIT: 1969/70 
(In per cent of group total) 
Source Thakurgaon Phulper 
Area 
Money lenders and shopkeepers 65.78 59.0 
Friends and Relatives 26 . 0 27.8 
Others 8.2 13.1 
Source : Asaduzzman and Hossain, 1974 
After independence in 1971, the government of Bangladesh undertook 
a number of steps in order to intensify the flow of institutional credit 
with a Vlew to decreasing the dependence of farmers on informal sources. 
But it lS. very difficult to quantify whether or not government inter-
vention in the rural financial market Slnce independence has had any 
tangible effect b e cause of the lack of the necessary broad based country 
wide survey. However , a few recent studies throw some light on the 
lssue . A 1977 survey conducted in two IRDP (Integrated Rural 
Development Programme) areas showed that 36.5 per c ent of loanees 
reported borrowing from money lenders and 26.6 per cent from institut-
ional sources , as shown In Table 3.5. 
These results suggest that the informal segment still domina t e s 
In the rural fin a nc ial market . However, it mu s t b e stre s sed that it 
lS very difficult to get a c18ar pi c ture of the re l ative 
share of the infor ma l and institutiona l segme nts on the ba sis of 
currently available studies. 
TABLE 3 . 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANEES ACCORDING TO 
SOURCES OF LOANS (1977) 
Source 
Friends and Relatives 
Money l e nders 
Co- operatives 
Bank 
Percentage of borrowers 
36.9 
36.5 
13 . 5 
13.1 
Source: IRDP, Bench-mark Survey, 1977 as quoted by Rahman, 1979. 
3 . 4 Supply of Credit : Institutional Sources 
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As mentioned in Chart 1 , the institutional sector of the arena of 
rural finance consists of the following agencles: 
(1) Government; 
(2) Co-operatives; 
(3 ) Comilla Co-operat ive (Integrated Rural Development 
Prograrrune) ; 
(4) Bangladesh Kr i shi Bank (Agr i cultural Development 
Bank) ; 
(5 ) Corrunercial Banks ; and , 
(6 ) Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of the Country) . 
3 . 5 Government (Taccavi Loan) 
Since the end of the last century the government has been helping 
farmers through the grant of loans known as Taccavi . These loans 
are usually granted by the government in times of natura l calamities 
like flood , cyc lone , etc., in order to help the fal~ers purchase seeds and 
cattle cHId also for the relief of distressed farmers . ormally the amount of 
I 
loan issued to a farm family does not exceed Tk.500. About 80 per 
cent of the Taccavi loan is given in kind as fertilizers, seeds, 
agricultural impl ements etc. (Islam, 1975). 
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Generally Taccavi loans are much sought after by cultivators 
because they carry a low rate of interest, do not have to be repaid 
quickly, have simpler security requirements than other sources of 
institutional credit and are available to those who are not eligible 
for normal institutional credit. Moreover, frequent writing-off 
of overdue loans by the government has created an impression amongst 
the farme rs that Taccavi loans are in t h e nature of a grant and may aga1n 
b e wri tten off in future ~d that the r e i s no need for repayment. As a 
r esult the r epayment position of this loan 1S very poor. 
In V1ew of this, the Taccavi loan has been criticised from time 
to time on the grounds that it is not being administered properly 
and the attitude towards repayment of this loan has adversely 
affected the recovery of other institutional loans. The Credit 
Enquiry Commission which was appointed by the then government in 1959 
also made the following recommendations: (Credit Enquiry Commission 
Report, 1960). 
(i) the government should not lend directly except 1n cases 
of distress; 
(ii) Institutional agenc1es should take over all agricultural 
credit activities and government may continue to give 
non-distress loans as a transitional measure ; 
(iii) To protect the statutory agricultural credit a genc1es 
from unnecessary competition, 1n areas where the offices 
of these agenc1es are established, the Revenue head of 
the district may decide whether a ny Taccavi i s to be 
extended for non-distress purposes; 
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(iv) Amount advanced should be sufficient for the purposes 
for which it is intended. 
Ta ccavi loans have been criticised In varlOUS quarters and in recent 
years the government has substantially reduced the supply of such loans, 
as can be seen from Table 3 . 6. It can be inferred that the criticism of 
the loan had a delayed effect. 
1 965- 66 
1966-67 
TABLE 3.6 
DISTRIBUTION AND RECOVERY OF TACCAVI LOAN: 
1965- 66 to 1975-76 
(In current mi l lion Taka ) 
Amount 
Di sbur sed 
17 . 80 
19 . 00 
Amount due * 
for recovery 
s ince 1965- 66 
119 . 69 
200 . 73 
Amount * 
r ecovered 
46 . 49 
53 . 58 
Percentage 
of 
recovery 
24 . 3 
26 . 69 
1 967-68 ~ 15.30 21 6 . 00 65.67 30.4 
1 968 - 69 
1969- 70 
1970-71 
1 971-7 2 
1 97 2-7 3 
1 97 3- 74 
1974 - 75 
1975- 76 
Note : 
Source : 
25 . 50 226.80 10 . 02 4 . 42 
30 . 0 234.75 24.76 10 . 5 
12 . 50 226 . 49 1.30 0.6 
163 . 50 23 7. 00 N.A. N.A. 
60 . 00 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
14 . 67 N. A. N. A. 1. A. 
10.00 N.A . N.A. N.A. 
4 . 00 N~A . N. A. N.A. 
ot available (N.A .) 
( i ) Bangladesh Agriculture In statistics, 1973 . 
(ii) Basic statistics of Bangladesh Agriculture, 1975-76. 
(iii )* Bangladesh Bank . Agridultural Credit Department as 
quoted from inistry of Agriculture, Government of 
Bangladesh . 
Although the Taccavi system of loans has continued to operate, 
the trend of allocations suggests that this system is likely to be 
abolished ln future . 
3 .6 Institutional Sources : Co-operatives 
The origin of the co-operative movement In Bangladesh as an 
effective agent In agricultural finance dates back to the year 1904 
when the Act relating to the development of co-operative societies on 
the Raifiesen type was passed . The primary objectives of this move-
ment in the earlier phases , (and even today) , was to provide credit 
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to small and margina l farmers; to save them from exploitation by 
money lenders and add i tonally to influence the process of agricultural 
development by mobilising the financial surpluses in the rural sector. 
The Co- operative credit structure in Bangladesh comprlses a 
three-tier system whi ch consists of (i) Bangladesh Jatya Samabaya 
Bank (National Co-operative Bank) at the top; (ii) 62 Central Co-
operative Banks at the secondary level; (iii) over 4000 Union Co-
operative Multipurpose Societies (UCMPS) at the primary level; and 
(iv ) 16 Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks also at the primary level. 
The ,Co-operative agencies have a widespread network for dispensing 
credit throughout the country . The agricultural co-operatives 
serve over 2 million agriculturists and their lending operations 
are mainly confined to members. They provide both short-term credit 
for financing seasonal crop production and medium-term loans for 
financin the purchase of draft cattle and agricultural implements 
and for fisheries . Previously these institutions used to provide 
long-term loans for land improvement, land development, redemption 
of old debts and purchase of agricultural machinery but this 
function is now undertaken by the Land Mortgage Bank (Alam and Momen , 
1978) . Table 3 . 7 shows the volume of crop loan supplied through the 
co - operatives during the last 17 years . 
Year 
1958- 59 
1959- 60 
1960- 61 
1961- 62 
1962- 63 
1963 - 64 
1964- 65 
1965- 66 
1966-67 
1967 - 68 
1968 - 69 
1969- 70 
1970- 71 
1971-72 
1972- 73 
1973- 74 
1974- 75 
Total 
Source : 
TABLE 3 . 7 
CROP LOAN OPERATION BY THE CO-OPERATIVES 
DURING 1958/59- 1974/75 
(in current million Takas) 
Amount Ut i lized Amount Realized 
3 . 50 3.50 
9.32 9 . 32 
37. 98 37 .43 
39 . 17 36.59 
25 . 43 14.90 
23 . 90 22 . 35 
20 . 00 14.79 
6.20 5.77 
18 . 46 15.88 
40 . 00 30 . 65 
70.00 52.65 
104 . 76 80.25 
161 . 41 75.07 
56 . 77 33.39 
139 . 55 66 . 90 
55.59 12 . 00 
5 . 28 0.001 
817 . 32 511 . 44 
Islam, 1975. 
Percentage 
Recovery 
100 
100 
98 
93 
59 
93 
74 
93 
86 
76 
75 
76 
47 
59 
48 
22 
62 
of 
48 
!J <) 
The yearly recovery rate of crop loans advanced through the co-
operatives declined from 100 per cent In 1958/59 to 22 per cent in 1973/74. 
During 1974/75 there was a dramatic drop In loans with virtually no recovery. 
From 1958/59 to 1974/75 , the co-operative societies issued loans amounting 
to Tk . 817.32 million , out of which Tk. 511.44 million were realised and 
TK . 305 . 88 million remained outstanding. Therefore, poor recovery of 
loans is one of the outstanding problems at present confronting the co-
operatives. This problem of poor recovery is Jargely Olle to procedurul delays In 
the disbursement of loans , slackness in administration and absence of 
on-the-spot verification of the utilization of loans. In addition, natural 
calamities like floods , droughts, cyclones, etc., often make it difficult for 
furmers to repay loans on time (Rahman , 1973) . Nevertheless, co-operative 
societies are also largely dominated by the well-to-do farmers who are also 
found to be big defaulters (Mol~a, 1979). As a result, experts are of 
the opinion that in order to make co-operatives viable institutions, they 
must be reorganised and streamlined for more efficient operations (Agricul-
tural Credit Study Project Report, 1978 ) . 
3.7 Institutional Sources: Comilla Co-Operative and IRDP: 
The well-known and widely discussed Comilla Co-operative system emerged 
out of the experiment carried out by Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Academy for 
Rural Development in the Katuwal~ thana of Comilla in 1960 with a view to 
overcoming some of the major failings of the traditional co-operative 
movement in the country. The model is a two-tier co-operative system 
under whi c h village based prlmary co-operdtive societies (KSS) are formed 
and affiliat at the thana level to form the Thana Central Co- operatives 
Association (TCCA). The Comilla co-operative system, unlike traditional co-
operatives whose main function is the distribution of credit , ha s introduced a 
production oriented and supervised cred i t programme and has integrated credit 
disbursement with supplies of modern inputs, training and extension services. 
The basic philosophy behind the Comilla approach was a commitment to 
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individual farming based on the private ownership and operation of l and 
and other means of production (Khan , A. R., 1979) . 
Since its inception the Comilla model has been envisaged as a means 
for economic development enabling the farmers to rally together to protect 
themselves from the exploitation of money lenders, to develop local 
leadership , to challenge the traditional vested interests and to create an 
institutional infrastructure conducive for development. The success of the 
Comilla model 1 has prompted the government to adopt and replicate 
this model throughout the country under the Integrated Rural Development 
Programme ( IRDP) launched in 1971. Since then the Thana Central Co-
Operative Association (TCCA ) , the village based primary Farmers' 
Co~operative Societies (FCS ) and membership in the FCS has been increasing 
rapidly as can be seen from Table 3.8. 
TABLE 3.8 
GROWTH OF TCCA , FCS AND THEIR MEMBERSHIP 
DURING 1971-72 - 1977 - 78 
Year No . of TCCA No . of FCS No . o f Member 
Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Avercloe per 
PCS 
1971- 72 10 33 1,561 5,680 33,564 1 36 , 316 24 
1972- 73 54 87 4,491 10 , 170 124 , 877 261,193 26 
1973- 74 65 152 4,519 14,690 126,097 387,290 26 
1974-75 9 161 3 , 001 17 , 691 93,18 4 480 , 474 27 
1975-76 1 162 1,284 18 ,975 45 , 166 525,640 28 
1976- 77 38 200 2,899 21,874 123,448 649,088 30 
1977-78 50 250 5,674 27,548 195 , 319 844 ,407 31 
Source: Rahman, K. M. , 1979 . 
1 For a critical discussion of the Camilla model see Khan, A.R . , 1979. 
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As mentioned above , supervised credit was the cornerstone of the 
co-operatives and accordingly the credit serVlce is integrated with the 
other essential services required by the farmer. Wst of the loan funds 
were made available by one of the nationalised commercial banks and loans 
are generally provided for crop production purposes. Table 3 .9 shows 
the volume of loans disbursed through IRDP since 1971-72 to the members. 
TABLE 3.9 
CREDIT OPERATION OF IRDP DURING 
1971-72 to 1977-78 
Amount Amount Percentage Amount disbursed* 
Year Disbursed Realised of Recovery (1969-70 prices) 
(in current million Taka) 
1971-72 62.08 29.20 47 51.1 
1972-73 20 . 84 9.77 47 11.5 
1973-74 24.14 20.02 83 9.6 
1974-75 31.77 24.14 76 7.8 
1975-76 50.32 36.41 72 13.2 
1976-77 75.10 53.03 71 19.6 
1977-78 128.12 88.84 69 29.1 
Source : Rahman, K.M., 1979 
* Amounts disbursed from 1972 to 1977 were deflated by the general cost of 
living index for the middle class in Dacca published by the Bangladesh 
Bank in Economic Trends, 1978-79. (19 69 -70 = 100), which is presented 
in the Appendix A. 
Compar ing the four cornmon years of Table 3 . 7 and Table 3.9 shows 
that the IRDP lent about half as much but had a better recovery rate (60%) 
than the traditional credit co-operatives. Another f ea ture to be noted 
in Table 3.9 is that although the amount disbursed through IRDP has 
increased from Tk. 62 million in 1971-72 to TK 128 million in 1977-78 the 
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strong inflationary pressure in the countrj eroded the purchasing power 
of the amount disbursed substantially. 
3 . 8 Institutional Sources : Bangladesh Krishi Bank (Agricultural 
Development Bank) 
The Bangladesh Krishi Bank (formerly Agricultural Development Bank of 
Pakistan) was established in 1961 following the merger of the ~gr icultural 
Bank of Pakistan and the Agricultural Development Finance Corporation. 
It was established with the spec ific object of o££c.;r-Ll1<j c redit facilities 
to farmers and persons engaged in the development of agriculture or 
agricultural products or on the storage, warehousing, marketing or processing 
of agricultural prodticts . 
The Bangladesh Krishi Bank is the only organisation in rural financial 
market with significant experience in dealing with agricultural development 
activities. The bank has a network of branches widely distributed over 
the country. At the time of liberation in 1971 it had only 7S branches 
but by the-end of 1978 the number of branches stood at 197. In addition, 
61 small rural branches have been opened during the last few years so as to 
make the bank ' s credit facilities widely available to the farmers at the village 
level (Molla,1979). The bank advances short, medium and long term loans. 
The short term loans are advanced for financing the cost of raising crops 
while medium term loans are granted to purchase durable assets. Long term 
loans are glven for developmental purposes. Table 3 . 10 shows the termwise 
break- up of the loan disbursement of the bank. 
Table 3 . 10 shows that the amount of credit disbursed in current Taka 
hllS incr '.J' eel co nsiclcrLlbly but Slilce lc)70 seVl'rc in[1dtjonary pressllre (11:;0 
have eroded a good deal of the purchasing power of the amount disbursed. 
~s can be eel) from T(lble 3.10 , in 1976-77 lo t() 1 purc}ltl sing power of the 
loans disbursed was almost the same as that disbursed in 1972-73. Another 
feature of the lending operation of the bank is that it gives as far as 
53 
TABLE 3.10 
CREDIT OPERATION OF BANGLADESH KRISHI BANK 
BY TYPE 
Percentage of Distribution Total In Total In 1969-70* 
Year of Type of Loan Current Prices (1969-70 = 100) 
Million (in million Taka) 
Short Medium Long Taka 
% % % 
1972 - 73 31.3 68.1 0 . 6 179 . 0 98.60 
1973 - 74 49.3 50.3 0 '.4 135.7 53.70 
1974-75 53.7 45 . 9 0.4 176.3 43.30 
1975-76 60 . 0 39.4 0 . 1 185.2 48.70 
1976-77 68.7 30 . 7 0.5 388.4 101.50 
Source : Bangladesh Krishi Bank Annual Reports, 1972-1977. 
* For deflator see Table 3.9 
possible , preference to the credit needs of small farmers. This is 
particularly important because the majority of the farmers in Bangladesh 
are small. Table 3.11 shows the percentage of the bank's borrowers by 
size of their land holdings. The finul column gives comparative figures 
of the percentage distribution of land holdings by size groups in 1977. 
Comparing Tables 3.10 and 3.11 shows that the trend towards a greater 
emphasis on short term credit coincided with the increasing emphasis on loans 
to farmers in the smaller groups. We n eed more information if we are to 
know whether these two trends are related or the result of independent policy 
decisions . 
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TABLE 3.11 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 'OF KRISHI BANK 
LENDING ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FARM HOLDINGS 
Size of YEA R Percentage Distrib-
ution of Farm 1 971 -72 1972-73 197 3- 74 1974-75 1975-76 Ho lding Holdings by Slze 
1977 
% % % % % 
i) Land l ess 0 .77 2 . 22 0.01 0 .01 0 . 01 11.07 
ii) Up to 
3 acres 45 . 59 54.23 58.55 63 . 00 58.96 72 . 78 
iii) Over 3 up 
to 12 . 5 
acres 47 . 32 37.23 38 . 05 33.76 38.50 14.84 
iv ) Over 12 . 5 
up to 
50 acres 5.26 6.07 3.25 3 . 0 6 2 . 47 1.31* 
Source : i ) Bank ' s Annual Report (1972-1977) 
ii) Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh , B . B. S . 1979 
* Over 12 . 5 acres 
3 . 8 . 1 Institutional Sources : Commercial Banks 
In the history of agr i cultural credit in Bangladesh , the commercial 
banks played an insignificant role until the early seventies . The 
following reasons are offered to explain their minor role: 
(i) The production period in agriculture , unlike industry, takes a 
longer period , as a result commercial banks are reluctant to make 
advances to cultivators because such loans would have to be given 
by violating the liquidity principle of bank advances . 
(ii) Th types of securities that farmers could generally offer are 
not suitable for cover ZlC)t1inst tlclv<lIlclnq loans . 
(iii) The prices of agricultural crops are subject to fluctuation due 
to n urul culumities . In such cases , conunercial bunks, from the 
point of view of profitability , find very little incentive for 
advancing credit against crops sown . 
In 
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(iv) the uneconomlC nature of a large 'number of agricultural holdings 
across the country hindered commerc ial banks from making acvances to 
cultivators. 
(v) The small Slze of individual loans lessens their remunerativeness 
However , since 1973 (after the n a tionalisation of all commercial banks) 
efforts have b een made by the Banlgadesh Bank (Centra l Bank ) to induce the 
nationalised commercial banks into the field of agricultural financing. 
Noticeable among these efforts has been the expansion in the number of 
branches of these banks. The number of rural bank branches increased b y 
285 per cent from 414 in June 1972, to 1594 in June 1978 (Ahsan, 1979). 
As regards the distribution of small loans to the agriculturists , the 
performance of the commercial banks till 1976 was not very satisfactory 
although a rapidly increas ing trend can be observed in Table 3.12. 
Year 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
TABLE 3.12 
DISBURSEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LOAN 
BY COMl1ERCIAL BANKS 
Amount Dispursed 
(in c urre nt million Taka) 
124.3 
93.00 
171.4 
378 . 1+ 
Total amount in * 
1969 -7 0 Prices 
49.2 
22 . 8 
45.1 
99 . 5 
Source : (i) Aqricu ltllrul Credit Department , Bangladesh Bank 
(ii) l\nnucl] Report , DClnqludesh Bunk , 1977 
* Por deflator see Tab l e 3.9 
+ Including the amoun t disbursed under SACP 
7\n important point to note is that ulLhou<Jh lel1c1Lllq by commerdul 
banks increased from Tk . 124 . 3 million in 1973- 74 0 Tk . 378 . 1 million 
in 1976-77 (in real term only Tk . 99.5 million) , during this period these 
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~nstitutions did not extend credit facilities directly to the agriculturalists 
instead they preferred to lend indirectly through cooperatives and other 
intermediaries . Their direct lending to agriculturists started after the 
introduction of Tk 1000 million Special Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP) 
in 1977 which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter . 
3 . 8 . 2 Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of the Country) 
Bangladesh Bank (formerly State Bank of Pakistan) Slnce its inception 
In 1948 , played an important role in the rural financial market of the 
country . But unlike other financial institutions , whose objective is to 
extend credit directly to cultivators , the Bangladesh Bank ' s role is 
inev i tably indirect . The Bank usually provides concessionary credit and 
counter finance facilities to the spec i al i sed agr i cultural credit institut-
ions , namely , Bangladesh Krishi Bank (Agricultural Development Bank), and 
Bangladesh Samabaya Bank (National Cooperative Bank) for on-lending to 
agricultural sector through their branches and agencles . The Bank has 
also statutory responsibility for formulating agricultural credit policy 
and providing a mo hinery for control, supervision and coordination of 
activities of agricultural credit institutions operating in the field 
( olla, 1 7 ). Both the Ag - l c ulturcll De velo pment l3ank a nd Coope r a tive Gu nk, 
de end almost e ntirely on funds from the Bangladesh Bank for their 
agricultural credit operations . This crucial role is shown in Table 3.13 
which gives the amount of credit sanctioned and disbursed by the Central 
Bank to these two institutions during the years 1976-77 to 197 8-79. 
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TABLE 3 . 13 
CREDIT DISBURSEMENT BY THE 'BANGLADESH BANK 
(in current million Taka) 
Year 1976-77 1977-78 1978- 79 
Credit 
Agency 
Sanction Disburse- Sanction Disburse- Sanction Disburse -
ment ment ment 
Bangladesh 
Krishi Bank 
Bangladesh 
Samabaya 
Bank 
Total 
385 .7 283 . 0 640 . 3 479.5 670.7 662.8 
112.9 109.2 248.2 155.7 202.7 198.9 
471.6 392 . 2 888 . 5 634.7 873 .4 861 , 7 
Source: i) Bangladesh Bank , Annual Report , 1977-78 
ii) Bangladesh Bank, Annual Report , 1978-79 
3 . 8 . 3 Credit Requirement and the Credit Gap 
In the preceding discussion consideration has been glven to the supply 
aspect of credit for agriculture . In this connection it would be worth-
while to mention the overall credit requirements of the farm sector. There 
lS no firm estimate of agricultural c redit r equirement in Bangladesh. Any 
. 
realistic estimate requires comprehensive field study of farm incomes and 
expenditure and the likely impact of the new technology . Furthermore, 
there is a methodological problem as to whether to include the consumption 
element of loans to marginal and small farmers in the demand for credit. 
10reover , since credit requirements vary according to farm size of the 
holding, the size of family and the level of income and expenditure, the 
aggregation of all farms into a total demand for credit would not be very 
useful. without examining such questions In depth , one researcher 
worked out hat he ratio 0 credit needed to be around 15 per cent 
of the agricultural value added to GOP (Khan, I . 1963). On the other hand, 
the Bangladesh Planning Commission estimated the credit requirements to be 
Tk 2572 million for short term credit and Tk 1078 million for medium and 
long term credit, on the assumption that 30 per cent of the total costs 
of production of major crops will be financed for the last year (1977 -7 8 )of 
he First Five Year Plan (Two Year Plan Report, 1978). Against this, the 
supply of institutional credit during the same period was T~ 1608 million 
(At 1969-70 prices the purchasing power of the amount disbursed is only 
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Tk 364 . 95 million) which is 44 per cent of the projected requirements. In 
this connection , it can be mentioned that the supply of Tk. 1608 million 
was largely due to the introduction of Tk . 1000 million Special Agricultural 
Credit Programme launched in early 1977 which wi.] 1 b e; 0. v,llllClI-. c cl In 
this dissertation. 
In view of the above , it is contended that Bangladesh has a very small 
amount of formal credit in comparison to other developing countries. In 
1976-7 7 the total formal loans amounted to only $58 million U.S . l (Tk. 865 
mill i on ) which has increased to about $93 million in real terms (nominally 
Tk . 1608 million but in 1976-77 prices only Tk. 1396) by 1977-78. In 
contrast , the Dominican Republ~c with a population of about 5 million 
approximately , half living in rural areas , but with a per capita GNP over 
10 times that of Bangladesh , had the equivalent of over SUS 140 million 
agricultural credit in 1976-77. Similarly, the Philippines, with roughly 
half of Bangladesh ' s population but with a GNP per capita 5 times as high 
made loans in the same period for agricultural production of SUS 1000 million. 
It is suggested that because rural incomes in particular and the national 
GNP per capita in general are very low, formal credit plays a minor role 
in rural financial market in Bangladesh (Adams and Nelson, 1979). 
3.9 Speci 1 Tk . 1000 million Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP) 
In the preceding discussion the role of the informal and the institution-
al segments in the rural financial market of Bangladesh have been disc ussed 
and it has been suggested that the informal segment is still meeting the 
bulk of the credit requirements of the farming households. Until 1976 the 
lOne US dollar = 15 Taka approximately. 
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institutional segment played an insignificant role in the sense that it 
could hardly meet 20 per cent of the projected credit requirements of the 
farming sector. This fact prompted the government to launch a Special 
Agricultural Credit Programme of Tk. 1000 million (SACP) in early 1977 
with a view to increasing the flow of institutional credit in the rural 
sector . In what follows , we shall discuss the major objectives of the 
programme and it s other features. 
3 . 10 Objective of the Programme 
The underlying philosophy which led up to the launching of the Special 
Agricultural Credit Programme in early February 1977 is that the traditional 
credit agencies (Cooperatives and Agricultural Development Bank) as well as 
the nationalised commercial banks have by and large failed to expand their 
credit activities in the rural areas in order to bridge the gap between the 
requirement for credit and the actual supply. Moreover, it was urgently 
felt that preferential treatment was necessary for the supply of 
inputs to marginal and small farmers because the markets for inputs 
(specially credit) are imperfect and non-neutral. They discriminate 
systematically against the small producer both In respect to the quantity 
of inputs (credit) supplied to them as well as the price (non-interest cost) 
at which they are made available to them In comparison to large farmers. 
In Vlew of the above the maJor objective of the programme was to provide 
credit for genUlne productive purposes mainly to the marginal, small farmers 
and share-croppers who had hitherto practically no access to institutional 
credit dllC to heir innbility to offer adequate security and fulfil other 
rms and conditions on which loans were usually given by the institutional 
aqencles (Srccial ~gricultural Credit Programme: Implementary Guidelincs, 
Bangladesh Bank, 1977). 
3.11 Features of the Programme 
The objective of the programme has been implemented by a number of 
procedural improvements: 
(a) the loan procedure under the programme has been simplified 
to a great extent so that an owner-cultivator or a tenant 
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or a share-cropper can get a loan, provided he is in bonafide 
possession of land under cultivation, simply by signing an 
application form and a crop hypothecation deed in the prescribed 
form (without any stamp duty). In addition, in order to prove 
his 'bonafide' an intending borrower owning land has to produce 
up-to-date rent receipts and Parcha (similar to title deed) 
from the revenue department. Loans to share-croppers will be 
secured similarly by hypothecation of crops and in addition 
one or two personal sureties who should preferably be the owner 
of the land which is under cultivation by the share-cropper. 
However , in the absence of the owner of the land, the \,oJard member 
or chairman of the union councilor any other person acceptable 
to the bank can also stand as surety for a share-cropper. 
Furthermore , provision was also made under the programme to 
provide credit on a group basis. In such cases the loans will 
be secured by hypothecation of crops and additionally by group 
surety bonds to be executed by the individual farmer belonging 
to the group . 
(b) For the wider coverage of the programme , all the SlX nationalised 
commcr i.ll bLlnks (who wcre hiLherto reluctLlnL to lend directly to 
the cultivators ) and the Bangladesh Krishi Bank (Agricultural 
Development Bank ) with their network of bran ches allover the 
country have been involved under the programme. Moreover, in 
order to popularise the programme among the farming community, all 
the government information media such as radio, T . V. etc. , 
have promoted the programme. 
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(c ) In order to minimise the non-interest costs of borrowing, 
provisions were made under the programme so that any farmer 
living at a distance of four miles or more from the branch 
bank can get loan money closer to home from booths opened by 
the mobile units of the branch at convenient places within the 
unlon. This is likely to save the borrowers considerable time. 
(d ) The credit target of Tk. 1000 million has been allocated to 
different districts on the basis of crop estimates. For the 
smooth and efficient operation of the programme , district 
committees were const i tuted which were responsible for the 
lloca tion of cre(lit alllong differen t unions and b.Jnk branches. 
This was done both to ensure the availability of inputs (such 
as fertilizer) and for the supervision of the credit. 
(e) In order to avoid duplication and to maintain an effective 
coordination in the disbursement of credit, a Lead Bank system 
has been introduced designating one commercial bank to act as 
Lead Bank for each district. The Lead Bank, in consultation with 
the district committee , will designate the unions to different 
bank branches so that no union is served by more than one branch 
bank. 
(f ) It has been decided that for the supply of inputs like fertilizer, 
seeds , etc., credit will be provided in kind and for this purpose 
he Bangladesh l\gric ultural Development Corporation has been Illude 
responsible to ensure the adequate and timely supply of fertilizer 
at the union level. Moreover , it has b een decided that the loan 
will be disbursed on the spot according norms prescribed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture . Finally, provision was made under the 
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programme to fix a maxlmum ceilin'g (up to 3 acres) beyond which 
loan should not be glven to an individual borrower. 
From the foregoing discussion it appears that the SACP has partly 
changed the security oriented loaning policy of the institutional agencies 
towards a more viable production oriented Agricultural credit policy. 
A main thrust of the programme appears to be the insistance that the nation-
alised commercial banks now serve the rural poor . The hope is that the 
commercial banks will have a tangible effect on the rural financial market 
of Bangladesh . Table 3.14 shows the allocation and disbursement of credit 
under the SACP for different banks for the calendar year 1977. 
TABLE 3.14 
ALLOCATION AND DISBURSEMENT OF CREDIT BY THE 
INSTITUTIONAL AGENCIES DURING (Calendar Year) 1977 
Institution 
Bangladesh 
Krish i Bank 
(Agricultural 
Development Bank ) 
Sonali Bank* 
Janata Bank* 
Agrani Bank* 
Rupali Bank* 
Pubali Bank* 
U L t 1: Cl B ,1 Jl k * 
Total 
Amount in current million 
Taka 
Allocation Disbursement 
211.3 160.5 
216.2 115.1 
I B5 . 9 7B.2 
163.9 Bl.O 
112.6 60 . 6 
103.0 55.5 
3B.7 17.B 
1031.6 56B.7 
Percentage of the 
amount disbursed 
out of the allocation 
76 
53 
42 
49 
54 
54 
46 
55 
Source : Development statistics of Bangladesh Agriculture, 1978 
* All six are commercial banks . 
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From Table 3.14 it can be observed that during the year 1977 (the 
first year of the programme) only 55 per cent of the total funds allocated 
has been disbursed by the Banks . It is also interesting to note that the 
performance of the Bangladesh Krishi Bank (Agricultural Development Bank) 
lS much better than the six nationalised commercial banks. 
Several factors are supposed to be responsible for the poor disburse-
ment of credit during the first year of the programme. 
ant factors are: 
The most import-
(i) In many cases the District Committees could not allocate credit 
coop-wise and union-wise in time. As a result the banks 
involved in the programme could not start disbursement of credit 
on schedule 
(ii) In some cases the intending borrowers could not produce rent 
receipts and Parchas from the revenue department due to the bureau-
cratic procedures of the revenue department officials. As a resuJt 
a large number of intending borrowers could not apply for loan 
in time. 
(iii) Provision was made under the programme for people who wanted to 
apply for a loan to be identified by the union council chairman, 
but it was found that in some cases the chairman was reluctant to 
identify the loanees in apprehension that he might be made personally 
responible for the repayment of the loan. 
(iv) The branches of the financing banks also found it difficult to 
disburse loan to share - croppers and tenants b ecause the land 
owners were reluctant to give particulars of the land under 
cultivation by share- croppers . 
(v) on-availability of transport and adequate security arrangements at 
rural bank branch level also made it difficult to carry cash to the 
booths of the mobile units of the bank branch. 
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However , In spite of all these teething problems , the government has 
decided that the Special Agricultural Credit Programme would continue to 
operate in the rural financial market of Bangladesh . 
CIlAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SURVEY AND 
DETAILS OF SAMPLE DATA 
4 . 1 Background and objective 
The Special Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP) of Tk . lOOO million 
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lS an attempt on the part of the Government and the Central Bank to increase 
the flow of credit in the rural sector of the economy . The programme is 
important not only because increased funds were allocated for disbursement 
among the farmers but because it was the first time in the history of the 
country ' s agr i cultural finance that al l Government machinery , - including the 
nationalised commerc i a l banks (which were hi therto reluctan -t to lend directly 
to the cultivators ) and the Agricultural Development Bank (Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank) , had been involved in a single programme. This reflects the Govern-
mentIs sens of urgency about t he problems and hence induced the tradit-
ionally financially conservative banking institutions to participate more 
widely in the rural financial market. 
with ,a view to evaluating the performance of the programme, the 
Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of the country ) carried out a field level survey 
covering the whole country . To conduct the sample survey, the study team 
of Mis . Robert R. Nathan Associates Inc., U. S . A. , was appointed by the Bank 
as consultants to study the agricultural credit system in the country. The 
team prepared the survey design along with the assistance of Bangladesh Bank 
officials . The field level enumeration was however conducted by the 
officials of the Bangladesh Bank and commercial banks. (The author of the 
present study was an enumerator in one of the districts . ) 
investigation was conducted during April-May , 1978· 
4 . 2 Description of the Survey Area 
The actual field 
Bangladesh lS almost entirely flat with hills only along the eastern 
and south-eastern boarder and covers an area of about 55,126 square miles -
a land of innumerable rivers flowing over a vast alluvial plain. About 
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90 per cent of the people live in village areas and their maln occupation 
lS agriculture and other allied activities. This is In fact one of the 
most thickly populated reglons In the world with over 1511 people per square 
mile (statistical Year Book , 1979) . From the administrative point of Vlew 
the country is divided hierarchically into 4 divisions, 19 districts, 
62 sub-divisions , 434 Thanas (locally known as police station), 4353 unions 
and 65 , 000 villages . A village is usually defined as a group of households 
within an arbitrarily defined territory . The lowest administrative stratum of 
the country is a unlon . 
In order to obtain a representative picture of the farming population 
which participated in the programme and those which did not, 15 districts out 
of the 19 districts were covered in the SACP survey . From 15 districts, 
30 police stations (Thana), 31 unions and 90 villages were selected. 
Altogether 1502 households were investigated of which 628 households 
participated in the programme, i.e. obtained a loan, while the remaining 
874 households did not participate. The present study is based on the 
information of the non-participant farm households. The map of the survey 
area l S shown in the n e xt page. 
4 . 3 De sign of the Survey and Method of Enql.!iry 
The statistical investigation was based on multi-stage random sampling. 
In the first stage , sample thanas were selected at random from the districts. 
In the second stage, sample unions were selected at random from the thanas 
and in the third stage, from each of the selected unions, 3 villages were 
chosen at random. The lowest sampling unit was, however, the hous ehold. 
Some we ight was glven to g e ographical variation of the districts in s e l e cting 
the primary and secondary sampling units, l.e. the thanas a nd unions. Three 
unions were selected from two large distric t s , one unlon e a c h was se l ec t ed 
from 2 small districts and 2 unions were each selected from the remaining 11 
districts at random, as shown in detail In Appendix C. The responsibility 
I. \ ~ (.
1 
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of random selection of villages and households was entrusted to the field 
investigators who were thoroughly trained and tested to be sure that they 
understood their job . For this purpose they were required to visit the 
financing bank branches to collect the list of those who had received credit 
under the programme and from the union council office they collected the 
list of all households from which to establish the list of non-recipients. 
After collecting this information a minimum of 30 respondents were selected 
from each union (approximately 10 households from each of these villages) 
with the help of a random number table supplied to the enumerators . While 
being random the methodology of selection of participants and non-participants 
in this survey was also haphazard leaving large discretionary powers to 
the field staff with all the potential that this has for introducing 
individual enumerator bias. In the survey documents that I have seen, the 
statistical rationale for the sampling procedure was not clearly defined. 
The enquiry was conducted by interview. Enumerators with prepared 
questionnaires were sent to the selected unions to interview the sample house-
holds. In order to col l ect information two sets of questionnaires were 
prepared; one set was related to the collection of information from participant 
households. This will be referred to as the ' primal' survey. The other set 
of questionnaires was designed for those non-participants and will be referred 
to as the ' dual ' survey . The questionnaire is reproduced ln Appendix B. 
This study is based on the information collected in the dual survey, that lS, 
information on those sample households who did not participate in the programme. 
It is customary to evaluate any credit programme only from the borrowers 
point of view, hence the use of the word ' primal' . The characteristics of 
non-borrowers are generally overlooked . Therefore, it is the main objective 
of this thesis to analyse the characteristics of those households who did not 
participate in the programme and to make a comparison with the primal survey 
report which was prepared by the study team and submitted to the Bank. 
4 . 4 Nature of Data Collected 
The dual questionnaire relates mainly to knowledge about the programme 
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and the clemclnd aspects of crcdi t of farm llbuscholds . 1\ cJeneral idea 0 f 
the nature of the information collected is given below, based on the maln 
headings of the questionnaire : 
(i) Slze of holdings 
(ii) Tenurial status of the households 
(iii) Knowledge about the programme 
(iv) Expected demand for production credit and purpose 
(v) Expected demand for medium-term credit and p urpos e 
(vi) Current borrowing and purpose 
(vii) Previous borrowing and purpose 
(viii) Outstanding debt 
4.5 Limitations 
All socio-economic surveys based upon interviews face difficulties 
which reflect upon the reliability of the results. In this survey utmost 
care was taken in the matter of collecting data to ensure accuracy. A good 
deal of attention was given in defining the terms used in the questionnaire 
as clearly as possible. with this end in view a pilot survey was under-
taken before the maln investigation was launched. Moreover, in a 
Bangladesh village it lS no t a n easy task to collect data because farmers 
are SUSPlClOUS of strangers and official agencies and for this reason the 
enumerators tried to impress upon the respondents the fact that the survey 
was undertaken by the Central Bank officials only to investigate c redit 
problems. (This mayor may not have overcome the farmers' suspicion that 
this investigation was seekin g information in order to i mpose higher 
government taxation. In order to avoid some biases In the answers the 
filled-in questionnaires were checked horough ly and carefully before coding.) 
It may be noted, however, that the sample size was small - only 874 farm 
households were i ntervi e wed out of a total of approximately 6 million farm 
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households in Bangl adesh . In this respect we cannot claim firmly that the 
sample represents the whole farming population of the country. But the 
Bank hoped that the survey could throw some light on the major lssue of the 
success of the widened credit scheme . Another limita lon of the survey 
was the poor q ues"tionnaire design. The que sti onnaire did not ask a number 
of important questions on some of the crucial variables which were discussed 
In Chapter 2 and are n eeded to complete a thorough economic analysis of the 
scheme. The specific limitations will become evident from the analysis In 
Chapter 6 . 
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C[ ll\rTr.R S 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY , OF DATA ANALYSIS 
5 . 1 General Hypotheses 
This chapter is mainly concerned with hypotheses regarding the ' dual' 
survey and the analytical techniques adopted to test those hypotheses . 
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4 , the main objective of this study is to 
evaluate the performance of the SACP from the non-participant's (that is , 
the dual) point of view, Slnce a report has already been submitted to the 
Bank with r e spect to the primal survey , those who did participate In the 
programme . 
In concentrating on the dual survey, the respondents knowledge of the 
programme can be presented in terms of a tree for expositional purposes as 
can be seen from Figure 5 . 1. The breakdown of the sample in Figure 5 . 1 
provides a convenient set of categories for which hypotheses may be advanced 
to analyse the characteristics of the sample. Keeping in view the objectives 
of the programme , the following hypotheses have been proposed : 
(i) -Knowledge about the programme is independent of farm Slze, 
that is, small , medium and large farms have equal knowledge 
of the prog ramme . 
(ii) Of those respondents who applied for a loan but did not get 
one , their farm size , is not significantly different from 
thos e who did not apply for a loan. 
(iii) There lS no significant difference between the farm Slze 
of those who applied for a loan but did not get and those 
who did not apply because they did not need credit . 
(j v) or L llO"t' It'~'l)Olld 'Ills \1/110 dPpl ied rur d lOdll bUl did Ilol 
get one, their farm size is not significantly different 
from those \1/110 id not apply DecC1use they believed thut 
h y would not ge a loan . 
() The [arm Slze 0 hose who ap lied for a loan ut did not 
get one , is not significantly different from hose ~ho did 
Note : 
~ ~'-l"U~~ -' • ...L. 
TREE DIAGRAM OF NON- PARTICIPANT ' S RESPONSE IN THE SURVEY 
Yes 
(776) 
Dual 
r 
Non - Participants 
Total Sample 874 
The Ha i n Survey 
The Pr oblem 
of the Programme 
- S131 No I - S132 
(98) 
appl i ed fo r l oan 
Primal 
Yes - S 
(105) 1311 
No 
(669) - S1312 
r 
No Need 
(230 ) 
S1313 
Why I d i d not apply 
Will Not Get 
(231 ) 
S1314 
1 
I .. 1 Partlclpants 
Total Sample 628 
1 
Other Reasons 
(206) 
S1315 
Figures within brackets indicate number of cases in each group . 
1 A memorandum submitted to the Bank by the study team with respect to those who participated in the Programme. 
-...j 
N 
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J1 0L apply [or u 1 0(J11 [ o r ' ()L1le!: p'asO'1S '. 
(vi) There is no signi ficant difference between the farm 
s iz e o f those who participated in the programme (i . e ., 
loan recipients) and those who did not participate In 
the programme (i. e. , non-recipi e nts) . 
5 . 2 Hypothe ical Demand for Credit 
In the survey , information was collected with respect to both the 
production and investment credit requirements of the farming households. 
In order to ascertain the production credit requirements of the respondents 
the following question was asked : 
" If you could borrow Tk.IOOO for a period of one year from 
a bank , how much would you like to borrow and for what 
purpose? " 
Similarly , with a Vlew to determining the investment credit requirements of 
the respondents the following question was put forward: 
" If you could borrow any amount of money from a bank, for 
a period of three years, how much would you like to borrow 
and for what purpose?" 
with this ,information it was decided to analyse the nature of the demand 
for credit among the different farm size groups and also the other factors 
which influence the demand for credit as indicated in Chapter 2. But the 
absence of a number of important variables prevented the unde rtaking of 
a full analysis . However , the available data does allow the postulation of 
a simplified model of the factors which influence the demand for c r e dit. 
With the hypothetical demand for credit as the dependent variable, the k ey 
explanatory variables to be considered in the model are (1) the area of 
owned land , (2) the areas r nted in and out , (3) areas mortgaged in and 
out , (4) lump sum inves tme nt, and finally (5) regional differences. 
The model is a simple additive model but is non-line ar with r e spec t to 
certain variables . Kmenta distinguishes two types of non-linea r mode ls 
depending on whether they are or are not linear with r e s pec t to the 
parameters to be estimated . The first type of model can be t e r med 
' intrinsically linear ' which means that the model is non-linear with respec t 
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to the variables but linear with respect to the parameters to be estimated . 
The second type of model lS called ' intrinsically non - linear' that is, models 
that are non- linear with respect to the variables as well as to the 
parameters (Kmenta , 1971) . The model we are concerned with lS an 'intrinsic-
ally linear ' but the relationship of demand for credit with respect to the 
variables considered lS unlikely to be strictly linear so the algebric form 
of the model allows for some square and ~ubic terms of key variables, 
as given in equation 5 . 1 : 
2 
+ B X . + B X 4 2h 5 2h 
B8X4h + B9Dlh + B10D2h + BllD3h + B12D4h + B13D5h + Uh 
(h = 1 , 2 ......... N ) 
N = Total number of observat ions 
(5 . 1) 
The data are presented by cross - section over N cases . C lS the dependent 
variable , XIS are the explanatory variables and U is the stocastic error 
term . We have N cases or observations , therefore, we have N number of 
observations on C . 
where , 
Cl 1 Xll 
C2 1 X12 
C = Ch X = 1 Xlh 
1 
C 1 X1N 
N 
The N equati o n s are presen ted in matrix form as -
C = XB + U • •.•• .. •... ( 5 • 2 ) 
Xl1 2 
X12 2 
Xlh 2 
X1N 2 
B = 
Xl1 3 
X12 3 
Xlh 3 
Xln 3 
13 
0 
lJ 
1 
B2 
B 13 
X2l 
X22 
X2h 
X2N 
X2l 2 X3l X3l 
2 
2 2 
X22 X32 X32 
X2h 2 X3h X3h 2 
X2N 2 X3N X3N 2 
U 1 
U 
:2 
U = U 3 
X4l Dll D2l 
X42 D12 D22 
X4h Dlh D2h 
Xt'JN D1N D2N 
D5l 
D52 
D5h 
D5N 
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The intercept B lS indicated by insertion ' of a unit column in the X matrix . 
o 
C is an N vector , X lS a NX14 matrix , B lS a vector of 14 variables and U 
lS the vector of error terms. 
The dependent variable , C , lS the stated amount of credit desired. 
The continuous independent variables are : 
X 
1 ' 
the amount of owned land (acres) i 
X 2 ' the area rented out (acres) ; 
X 3 ' 
the area mort gaged out (acres) and , 
X , the amount of l and rented In (acres ). 
4 
These have been augmen ted by a set of dummy variables which represent lump 
sum investments that ' shift ' the bas i c model . The dummy variables are: 
0 , investment 
1 
In fish cul t ure ; 
0 , investment In irrigation machinery ; 
2 
0 , investment In business ; 
3 
0 4 ' investmen t In buying l and ; and , 
0 5 ' investment I n p u rchasing miltch cow . 
B - B are the parameters to be estimated. 
0 13 
U is the error term . 
This model has been suggested by some initial tabular analysis of the data . l 
It is hypothesised that -
(i) The credit requirements among the farming households vary 
according to farm size by increasing rapidly as farm Slze 
initially increases above the ' sub-economic ' and margillal 
levels but then ·tails off with furth e r increases in farm 
l..ZC . This hypoLh c sis lS givcn c xpre ssion in Lh o mo d e ] lJy 
the cubic form of X . 
1 
1 This researcher recognises that it is not scientifically correct to 
test a hypothesis on the very data set that has suggested the hypothe sis . 
However , the tabular analysis only gave the ' bones' of the ideas and it 
is hoped that the regression model will set some 'meat' on them in a 
formal relationship . 
(ii) The demand for credit varies according to tenurial status 
of a cultivator . In other words , the credit requirements 
of an owner farmer , owner-cum- tenant and tenant farmer 
differ because of the land ownership pattern in the society. 
Thus we have variables X , X and X in the model . 
234 
(iii) That there are considerable shifts in the basic ' area-owned 
and area operated' model due to ' lumpy ' investments which 
may be sought by farmers of any Slze. 
(iv) The credit requirements among the farming households also 
vary due to identifiable regional differences . 
5 . 3 Analytical Techniques 
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As indicated in the previous chapter the survey omitted many variables 
which are likely to influence the demand for credit and hence a complete 
model is not possible . Therefore , the underlying philosophy of our 
analytical approach to the data that was collected lS to keep the analysis 
as simple -and straightforward as possible . Our work lS bas ed primarily 
2 
upon the X - test, student T-test and multiple r eg ression analysis . In 
what follows a brief description is given of these techniques and their 
application to the analyses . 
5 . 4 Chi-Square Test 
As mentioned in Section 5 . 1 our first hypothesis is that 'knowledge 
about the programme is independent of farm Slze . That is, small, medium 
and large farms have equal knowledge about the programme ' . The Chi-square 
est has been used to t est the significance of differences of ' knowledge gap ' 
bctween he t\I/O inL1cl endcn groups , l. e . of ' hose rcspondcnLs who knew C1bout 
the programme and those who did not know about the programme . In order to 
perform the test the two grou s have been categorised into small , medium and 
large farms according to the size of holdings. Three categories of holdings 
(0- 2 . 5 acres, 2 . 5- 7 . 50 acres and above 7.5 acres) are used to define small , 
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medium and large farms respectively . The ,total number of sample was 874 
farm households , out of which 387 , 358 and 129 are small , medium and large 
farms r espectively . 
The test statistic lS (Walpole , 1974 . p . 228 ) 
2 
X 
e. 
l 
= 
K 
L: 
i-l 
R X 
T 
2 (0 e. ) 
l l 
e . 
l 
C 
X
2 > X2 CR lS v (a) , V= (r-l ) (C- l) degree of freedom . 
Where , 
O. = Observ ed freque n cy of those respondents who knew and those 
l 
who did not k now about the programme ; 
e. = Expected frequency of those respondents who knew about 
l 
th prograrrm1e and those who did not know about the 
prograITU11e i 
R = Row total 
C Column tota l 
T = Grand total of all observed frequencies . 
v = Degree of freedom 
a = Cl leve l . 
It is contended that the chi- square test can be applied under the following 
condition : (Kendall , 1944) . 
(a ) The numbe r of samples should be r easonably large i otherwise 
X2 distribution is not normally distributed . 
(b) The cell fr eque ncy should not be small . 
(c) The cOl1s Lraint musL be linear . 
Since our total number of independ e nt observations is 874 and it is 
assumed to be normally distributed , the r efore , we can expect that this test 
can be a good estimator of ' knowledge gap ' among the three categories of 
farm households . 
/ 
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5.5 T-Test 
A T-test was used to test for differences In mean land holding among 
the varlOUS groups of farm households who did not participate in the 
programme . The test was carried out by uSlng the following formula 
(Nie et aI , 1975. p .270). 
-
t 
(xl - x 2 ) - (U l - U 2 ) 
~/nl + 5 22/n 2 
This statistic lS not exactly distributed as student ' s t. The probability 
for t can be approximated by treating it as t , but with degrees of freedom. 
222 [(Sl /n1 ) + (S2 /n 2 )] 
df = 
5 . 6 Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis uSlng the Ordinary Least Squares Method (OLS) was 
carried out to estimate the parameters of our postulated model. ~\1hen uSlng 
the least square estimator to estimate the coefficients of the regression 
equation , the three important statistical assumptions are considered: 
(i) IIomosc c dasticity . 
(ii) Non-auto correlation . 
(iii) Non-multicollinearity . 
This implies that the OLS method provides the best linear unbiased estimator 
if the above assumptions hold true. The assumption of homoscedasticity 
implies that the variance of the disturbance term U is constant for all 
observations . Although usually a problem associated with time serles 
analyses, the assumrtioll of homoscedasticity lS a bold assumption to make 
when dealing with country-wide cross - section data . The second assumption 
is that the stochastic error term lS an independent random variable and if 
he values of the random variable U are not independent from its own 
preceding values , there is autocorrelation or serial correlation of the 
random variable . In this case if we apply OLS , the variances of parameter 
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estimates are underestimation. It lS gene~ally contended that in dealing 
with cross-sectional data , there lS less possibility of violating this 
assumption (Kmenta , 1971) . In order to test this assumption in time serles 
analyses the Durbin-Watson test statistic has been used . The formula 
for the test statistic is as follows (Nie et al , 1975) : 
i=2 
n 
i =l 
2 (e, - e,-l) 
l l 
2 
e . 
l 
where e, lS the residual for case i and n is the number of cases . 
l 
This 
statistic lS the ratio of the sum of squares of succeSSlve differences of 
residuals to the sum of squared residuals . 
Th e third assumpt ion of OLS is that the explana-tory variables are not 
highl y linearly correlated . If the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated a problem of multicollinearity exists . In this connection it 
can be mentioned that in estimation it lS the degree of multicollinearity 
which is important and not the type . To detect multicollinearity in 
mult i ple regression analysis it is useful to observe the simple correlation 
matrix for explanatory variables which will be discussed further in the 
results of analysis . 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of three parts. The first part discusses the 
details of the s ·tatistical results which test the hypotheses proposed ln 
Chapter 5 with respect to the farmers' knowledge of the Tk.lOOO million 
Special Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP). The second part of the 
chapter concentrates on the hypothetical demand for credit and the last 
section of the Chapter deals with the actual borrowing of the sample 
armers . 
6 .1.1 Analysis of Farmers' Knowledge about the Programme (SACP). 
As mentioned earl i er , the SACP is intended to be a bold step undertaken 
by the government in order to facilitate the flow of credit to the agricul-
tural sector in general and to the small farmers ln particular, with easy 
terms and conditions . The strategy was adopted to ensure an effective 
coverage ot all farm households in the agricultural sector. with a Vlew to 
popularising the programme among the farm households, all government inform-
ation media such as radio , T . V., newspaper, etc ., were involved. Moreover, 
the Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank) and participating financial institutions 
and the Ministry of Agriculture also distributed pamphlets in every union 
with the intention that no farmer should remain ignorant of the Programme 
and its objectives . Thus it is expected that every farm household in the 
rural sector knew about the Programme . Therefore, the f i r st hypothes i s 
p r opos e d i s tha t knowledge about the Programme in the sample of farms not 
uSlng the Programme is independent of farm size l , i.e. s mall, me dium and 
large farmers have equal knowledge about the Programme. The Chi-square test 
has been conducted to examine the signific ant differenc e among thes e group s. 
1 For this analysis farm sizes are classified into 3 as 0-2 . 5 a c res, 
2 .5-7.5 acres , and above 7.5 acres to define small, medium and large 
farmer respectively . 
The result of the test is presented in Table 6.1, where the general level 
of knowledge (nearly 90%) is impressive. 
TABLE 6.1 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SACP ACCORDING TO FARM SIZE 
2 
USING X TEST 
Size of holding K NOW LED G E 
(acres) 
YES NO TOTAL NOT KNOWING 
(%) 
(Number of farmers In sample) 
o - 2 . 5 330 57 387 14.7 
2.5 - 7.5 326 32 358 8.9 
7 . 5 - above 120 9 129 7.0 
TOTAL 776 98 874 11.02 
2 
Notes: X value = 8 .99 
2 X .05 = 5.99, significant l. e . 8 .99 > 5.99 
2 The X value at the 5 % level of significance is higher than the tabulated 
value and therefore we have rejected the null hypothesis. The analysis 
8 1 
reveals that farm size and knowledge about the Programme are not independent. 
However, we cannot generalise from this result because if we compute a 
frequency distribution of knowledge by district (Table 6.2) this r e veals 
that in two districts (14 and 15, l.e. district Tangail and Sylhet) the 
proportion of the [arm households who did not know (i.c. knowledge gap ) lS 
very much higher than in the other districts. This possibly explains the 
results in Table 6 .1. In order to investigate this problem we agaln 
conducted X2 test to determine whether within the two districts farm size 
and knowledge about the Programme are independent or not . The results are 
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presented in Table 6.3. 2 The tabulated X value at the 5 per cent leve l of 
significance lS 5.99 which is higher than the calculated value of 3 .05 and 
In this case we have accepted the null hypothesis that knowledge of the 
Programme (i.e. knowledge gap) lS independent of farm Slze. 
TABLE 6.2 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE CREDIT PROGRAMME 
ACROSS DISTRICTS 
District Distribution of Respondent 
YES NO 
Dinajpur 74 8 
Rangpur 58 1 
Mymensingh 81 3 
Kushtia 41 0 
Rajshahi 66 1 
Jessore 54 2 
Barisal 64 1 
Patuakhali 56 2 
Faridpur 42 1 
Noakhali 59 0 
Khulna 35 5 
Pubna 31 3 
Bogra 32 1 
Tangail 49 50 
Sylhet 34 20 
TOTAL 776 98 
Note: Yes = Knew about the programme 
No = Did not know. 
TOTAL NOT 
82 
59 
84 
41 
67 
57 
65 
58 
43 
59 
40 
34 
33 
99 
54 
874 
KNOWING (%) 
9.8 
1.7 
3.6 
0 
1.5 
3.6 
1.5 
3.4 
2.3 
0 
12.5 
8.8 
3.0 
50.5 
37 . 0 
11 . 2 
TABLE 6.3 
FARM SIZE AND KNOWLEDGE IN ' TWO DISTRICTS 
Farm size 
(acres) 
YES 
o - 2 . 5 38 
2 . 5 - 7 . 5 31 
7 . 5 - above 14 
TOTAL 83 
Notes: 2 X value = 3 . 05 
2 
X (.O S) = 5 . 9 
2 
USING X TEST 
K NOW LED G E 
NO TOTAL 
(Number of farmers In 
40 78 
24 55 
6 20 
70 153 
NOT KNOWING 
sample) 
51.3 
43.6 
30.0 
45.8 
not significant l.e. 5.99>3 .05 
YES = knew about the Programme 
NO = did not know 
83 
( % ) 
2 The above conflicting results of X test do not enable us to draw any firm 
conclusion because the measurement involved in the X2 test is as weak as 
nominal scaling . (Siegel, 1956) . Therefore we turn to the T-test to compare 
differences in means. The hypothesis is rearranged to state that there 
is no significant difference In mean Slze of land -holding between those who 
knew and those who did not know about the Programme. The results are 
presented in Table 6.4. The results obtained from the analysis reject the 
null hypothesis which implies that there is a significant difference in mean 
land holding between the two groups . From this result we cannot even draw 
any firm conclusion because in our earlier analysis using the X2 test in the 
two districts where the proportion of farmers did not know about the Programme 
is higher as compared with the rest of the districts and it was observed 
TABLE 6 . 4 
COMPARISON OF MEAN LAND HOLDING BETWEEN TWO GROUPS 
USING T-TEST 
N. of Cases Mean Std.Dev. Std. Error T-value 
* 
YES 767 5 . 03 8 .19 . 30 3 . 96 
NO 90 3 . 38 2.78 . 30 
Notes : * significant at .01 per cent level 
YES = Knew about the Programme 
NO = Did not know 
+ D.F 
323 . 25 
84 
+ degree of freedom 1S calculated by uS1ng the following formula: 
[Nie , Hull , Jenkings & Bent 1975J. 
df = 
222 [(Sl /n l ) + (S2 /n 2 ) J 
2 2 2 2 [(Sl /n l ) / (nl-l)J + [(S2 /n 2 ) / (n 2-l)J 
that knowledge is independent of farm Slze . Therefore, we want to invest-
igate again whether -the mean land holding between the two groups of farmers 
in the two districts where knowledge is independent of farm size 1S signific -
a ntly different or not . The results of our analysis are presented 1n 
Table 6 . 5. The analysis reveals that the mean land holding between the two 
groups of farm households in the two districts is different . 
2 
Therefore from the overall results obtained from using both the X test and 
the T-test between the two groups of farmers l e nd us to conclude that there 
is no systematic bias aga inst tl1e smal l farmers with respect to knowledge of 
the Programme but that there WuS a location specific bias at the 10 % level . 
This me=>n ~ tIl=> t-1 ]0 l' f t' d" u 0 u n -orma lon me la lnvolved in the Programme were 
s uccessful in disseminating knowledge about the Programme except in the two 
districts of Tangail and Sy lhet. 
TABLE 6 . 5 
COMPARISON OF MEAN LAND HOLDING BETWEEN 
TWO GROUPS IN TWO DISTRICTS - USING T-TEST 
N. of Cases Mean Std . Dev . Std . Error . T-Value 
YES 
No 
Notes : 
82 
64 
4 . 40 
3 . 33 
4.30 
2 . 77 
* significant at 10% level 
YES = Knew about the Programme 
. 48 
. 35 
NO = Did not know about the Programme . 
* 1 . 83 
D. F. 
139 . 30 
6 .1.2 Comparison of the Mean Land Holding of Those Who Applied for Loan 
But Did Not Receive and Those Who Did Not Apply . 
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As mentioned earlier one of the main objectives of the SACP is to 
provide production credit to the small , marg ina l farmer and share-croppers. 
Therefore it is pertinent to examine the characteristcs of the farm 
households who appl i ed for , but did not receive loan and those who did not 
apply. Accordingly we have hypothesis e d that there is no significant 
difference in the mean size of land holding between those who applied for 
loan but did not receive and those who did not apply . We conducted a 
T-test and the results are presented in Table 6 . 6 
The results of the comparison of the mean land holding obtained from 
the analysis rejects the hypothesis of 'no difference ' in holding size . 
This impJies that those fCirmers who applied for loan from the proqramme 
but did not get any are smaller l and holding class as compared with those 
who did no t apply. 
TABLE 6 .6 
COMPARISON OF MEAN LAND HOLD ING OF THOSE WHO APPLIED 
FOR LOAN AND THOSE WHO DID NOT APPLY 
T-TRST 
N. of Cases Mean Std.Dev. Std .Error " T-Value 
YES 
NO 
104 
661 
3 . 93 
5 . 20 
3 . 00 
8 .7 4 
Notes : * significant at .01 per cent level 
YES = Applied for loan 
NO = Did not apply 
. 30 
.34 - 2.84* 
D.F. 
439 . 05 
6.1.3 Comparison Between Those Who Applied for Loan and Those Who Did Not 
Because They Did Not Need Credit 
As mentioned In Chapter 2 the demand for credit is influenced by 
several faGtors. Moreover , credit ' requirements also vary according to 
size of farms. Therefore it can be argued that not every farmer requlres 
production cred i t. This is also clearly evident from our survey where 
28 per cent of farm households out of the total sample of 8 74 indicated 
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that they did not need credit . Thus we are interested in investigating the 
nature of the households whi ch applied for loan but did not get any and 
those whi c h did not apply because they did not need production credit. 
Accordingly we h ve proposed our third hypothesis that there is no 
significant differen c e in the mean l a nd holding s of those who applied for a 
loan from the SACP but did not get one, and those who did not apply because 
, they did not need credit . The results of our analysis are p r esented in 
Table 6 . 7 . 
The results obtained from the analysis reject the nul l hypothesis at 
the 1 % l evel of significance and accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
Result 
TMLE 6 . 7 
COMPARISON OF MEAN LAND HOLDING OF THOSE WHO GOT A 
LOAN AND THOSE WHO APPLIED UNSUCCESSFULLY 
OR WHO DID NOT APPLY 
USING T-TEST 
Unsuccessful 
Recipient Applicants 
1 2 
No Need 
3 
Did Not Apply 
Would 
Not Get 
4 
Other 
Reasons 
5 
87 
........................... Nwnber of Households ....................... . 
(623) ( 104) (230) (229 ) (200 ) 
Mean (1) 5 . 40 T(1&2)4.20* T(1&3)-1.77 T(1&4) 3 . 89* T(1&5) .41 
Std . Dev(l) 4 .13 
Mean (2) 
Std . Dev(2) 
3.93 T(2&3) - 3 . 86 * T(2&4) -. 28 T(2&5)-1.32 
3.00 
Mean(3) 
Std . Dev(3 ) 
6.49 T(3&4)3.65* T(3&5)1.41 
9.00 
Mean (4) 
Std . Dev(4 ) 
4.04 T(4&3)-1.18 
Mean (5) 
Std.Dev(5) 
Notes : 
4.66 
* significant at 1 % level 
5 . 06 
11 . 48 
Figures in the brackets indicates numbers of households In 
each group. 
mean l and holding between the two groups is significantly different . 
implies that those who applied for loan are mostly small farmers, or 
conversely , tha it was indeed the l arger farmers who did not apply for 
credit because they did not need it . 
This 
6.1 . 4 Comparison of Farm Size of Household$ Who Applied for Credit and 
Those Who Did Not Apply Because They Believed They Would Not Get a Loan 
In Bangladesh villages, control over land and control and authority 
over local level institutions usually go together . Therefore under the 
existing agrarian system , availability of institutional credit depends to 
a large extent upon how much land a person holds and also his relation-
ship with the power structure of the society where he lives. In such a 
situation a farmer knows very well on a priori basis whether he will or 
will not get cred i t from the institutional sources . This is also clearly 
evident from our Survey which indicates that 26 per cent of farm families 
did not apply for credit from the SACP out of the total sample of 874 
households because they knew that they would not get credit . Therefore , 
it is interestin g to look at the size of holding of these two groups of 
farmers and to test e1e fourth hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the mean land holding between the two groups . The results 
of this comparison are presented in Table 6 . 7 . The analysis reveals 
that there is no significant difference in mean land holding between the 
two groups . On the basis of these results it appears that those farmers 
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who did not apply because they would not get credit are mostly small farmers. 
6 . 1.5 Comparison of Farm Size Between Farmers Who Applied and Those who 
Did Not Apply for Credit for "Other Reasons" . 
As mentioned earlier , to obtain credit from the institutional sources 
the farmer has to complete many bureaucratic formalities such as the 
submission of detailed application form and accompanied by an encumbrance 
certifica e from the revenue department . Such formalities may be necessary 
to enable the bank to get to ' know ' the farmer but present the farmer with a 
major obstacle in obtaining credit from the institutional sources . Moreover, 
they may have to pay several dues to intermediaries In order to fulfil 
cumbersome formalities and even then credit may not be available in time. 
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Although under the SACP , the loan procedure has been simplified to a great 
ex ent yet in most of the cases the small,marginal farmers and share-
croppers were in difficulty to get surety from the union council chairman 
and other local influential persons. Therefore , those farmers who did 
not apply for loan for ' other reasons' would be those who were unable to 
fulfil the abovementioned formalities . The results of the statistical 
test of our fifth hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
mean land holding between those who applied and those who did not apply 
for ' other reasons ' are presented in Table 6 .7 . The results obtained from 
our analysis accept the null hypo "thesis that there is no significant 
difference in the mean land holding between the two groups which implies 
that those who did not apply for 'other reasons ' also fall into the same 
ca egory . 
6 .1.6 Comparison of Farm Size of Households between loan recipients and 
non-recipients 
As already mentioned , a report on loan recipients has already been 
submitted to the Bank . A crucial test of the success of the performance lS 
whether or not there is a significant difference between the size of holding 
of recipients and non - recipients . Our sixth hypothesis was that there is 
not a significant difference between the mean size of land holding of loan 
recipients and non-recipients . The non-recipients are sub-divided between 
those who did not get a loan and those who did not apply for various reasons. 
The results of these comparlson are presented in Table 6.7. The analysis 
reveals that there is a significant difference between the mean land holding 
size of recipients and unsuccessful applicants . However, there lS not a 
significant ifference In the meclD lund holding of loun recipients CLnd those 
who did not apply because they did not need credit . On the other hand , there 
is u signj Eic,nt difference between the mean land holding of recipients and 
those who did not apply because they believed that they would not get a loan . 
These results show that the land holdings of the unsuccessful applicants and 
those who did not apply because they believed that they would not get a loan 
are significantly smaller than those of the loan recipients. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, data were collected for the 
expected demand for credit of the farm households who did not participate 
in the Programme. The following hypothetical question was put forward to 
ascertain the nature of the credit requirements: 
"I f you could borrow up to Tk 1000 from a bank "for a period 
of one year , how much would you like to borrow and for what 
purpose?" 
with this information , it was decided to analyse the varlOUS factors 
which are likely to influence the demand for credit by specifying a simple 
model as indicated in Chapter 5. But it was found that there was not 
enough variation in the data to enable such an analysis to be undertaken. 
Instead, tabular analysis was carried out which was expected to 
show the nature of the demand for credit In the various categories 
of farm household In the sample which can be seen from Table 6.8. 
. 1 Farm Slze 
Operational 
(Acres) 
o 
0 .1 - . 99 
1.0 - 2 . 5 
2 . 5 - 5 . 0 
5 . 0 - 7.5 
7.5 and above 
Total 
TABLE 6 . 8 
HYPOTHETICAL DEMAND FOR Tk.lOOO 
ACCORD ING TO FARM SIZES 
No Need 
of loan 
Less than 
Tk. 1000 
Tk. 1000 
Distribution of Respondents 
7 4 q 
(41 ) (24) (35 ) 
14 23 55 
(15 ) (25) ( 60 .) 
49 39 140 
(22 ) (17) (61) 
69 31 169 
(26) (1 2) (63 ) 
50 1 91 
(35) (0.7) (64) 
56 7 63 
(44) (6 ) (50) 
245 105 524 
(28) (12 ) ( 60) 
Note : Figures within bracke s indicate percentages . 
Total 
17 
92 
228 
269 
142 
126 
874 
1 Operational holding h s been defined as owned land plus rented In 
mortgaged in minus rented out plus mort aged out . 
plus 
Fr om Table 6 . 8 i t can be observ ed that h e demand for c r edit varles 
according 0 farm SLze. Of those wi t h z e r o op e r a tion a l ho l d i ng , 41 per cent 
did not n eed c r ed i t , 24 pe r cen wa n ted l ess- t ha n Tk.1000 a n d t h e remain ing 
35 p e r cent wa nted t o borrow Tk.lOOO. Similarly, those fa r ms with l ess 
than one acre of operational holding (i.e. near landless according to our 
definition), 15 per cent declined to borrow but 85 per cent wanted to 
borrow. It may be noted that this group has been excluded from the production 
credit requirement but for other purposes such as dairy, poultry, etc. , which 
generate extra income , their demand for credit lS likely to be high. On 
the other hand , of those farms who have 1-2.5 acres (i.e. marginal farmer), 
22 per cent did not want to borrow but the remaining 78 per cent wanted to 
bo rrow. We have I s o a rgue d e arlier t hat this g roup of farmers is pote ntia lly 
viable for produc tion credit a nd the ir nature o f demand for credit is ine las tic. 
Similarly , of those with between 2 . 5 acres to 5 acres (i.e . small farms) 
26 per cent declined to borrow but 74 per cent wanted to borrow. On the 
other hand , of the medium and large farms , those with between 5 . 0 and 7.5 acres 
and 7 . 5 acres and above , 35 per cent and 44 per cent did not need credit, but 
the remainihg 65 per cent and 56 per cent wanted to borrow although they 
should have no need for production credit . However, the foregoin g 
analysis suggests that the credit need does indeed vary according to farm 
size but that the hypothetical credit need for a one year loan of up to 
Tk . 1000 is not a simple linear relationship since more farmers at either end 
of the size continuum express ed "no need " for credit than did those away 
from the extre mes of distribution . 
6 . 2 . 1 Tenurial Status and the Dema nd for Credit 
The tenurial status of a farmer is likely to influenc e the demand for 
credit . Ge ll r a lly thr e b r oa d cate gories of t e nuria l a rrangemen ts a r e 
prevalent In rural Bangladesh. These are own e r farmer , owne r-c um-te n a nt 
and tenant . An own e r farmer lS usually in a better position in c o mp a ri son 
to a tenant farmer b e cause h e does not have to share hi s p roduce with 
anybody , whereas the tenant farmer has to share his output with h is land lord. 
As a r e sult a t e n a n t farmer o ften c a nnot gener ate enough surplus to f i nance 
farm operations and meet other expenditures. It is also contended that a 
tenant farmer is not less efficient in resource allocation in comparlson 
to owner farmer (Cheung , 1969 , Hsiao , 1975)" Therefore , the credit needs 
of a tenant farmer are likely to be greater than an otherwise equally placed 
owner farmer . Table 6 . 9 shows the hypothetical demand for Tk.lOOO 
according to tenurial arrangement. 
Unfortunately only 2 per cent of the sample are pure tenants (Table 6.9) 
so firm conclusions are difficult to make , however 31 per cent of owner 
farmers did not need credit whereas only 6 per cent of tenant farmer:. 
d eclined to borrow , although the remalnlng 94 per cent wanted to borrow. 
Not only did a higher proportion of owner - tenants and tenants want to borrow 
but an increasing proportion of farmers wanted to borrow the full amount of 
the potential loan. Table 6 . 9 g lves a rough indication that credit needs 
do vary according to the t e nurial status of a farmer and t hat they are highe r 
In the case of tenant farmers as compared with own e r and owner - cUID- tenant 
farmers . 
Tenure 
Owner f armer 
Owner - cum- tenant 
Tenant 
Total 
TABLE 6.9 
HYPOTHETICAL DEMl\ND FOR CREDIT 
ACCORDING TO TENURE 
o Need 
of Loan 
Le ss than 
Tk. 1000 
Distribution of 
17 2 
(31 ) 
64 
(22 ) 
1 
(6) 
237 
(28 ) 
54 
( 10 ) 
44 
(15 ) 
3 
(19 ) 
101 
(12 ) 
Tk. 1000 
Respondent.s 
32 7 
(5 9 ) 
179 
(62) 
12 
(75) 
518 
(61) 
No to : F ' ql1res Wl hin the brackets indic':} te I lercC"1l Laqc , 
6 . 2 . 2 Region 1 Variation and the Demand for Credit 
Total 
553 (GG 
287 (32) 
16 ( 2 ) 
856 
Regional (spatial) variations are also likely to influe nce the demand 
for credit . Even in the alluvial plain o f Bangladesh every region or 
district i s not equally e ndowed with good quall'ty land d' , an lrrlgation fa_il -
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it: ies . orc'()vt'r , d(,CC' SS l-o mOc1C'rn inputs cln(1 melrk ts lS (1 1so not sPel l j ,l lly 
equa l either between or within regions. Therefore, it l S very likely that 
credit TC'quir mc nts will also vary accord in~ to region . Table 6 . 10 s hows 
the hypothe tica l demand for Tk . lOOO in 15 districts of Bangladesh . 
District 
Dinajpur 
Rangpur 
Mymensingh 
Kushtia 
Rajshahi 
Jessore 
Barisal 
Patuakhali 
Faridpur 
Noakhali 
Khulna 
Pabna 
Bogra 
TABLE 6.10 
HYPOTHETICAL DEMAND FOR. CREDIT 
Did not 
need 
ACCORDING TO DISTRICT 
Less than 
Tk. 1000 
Tk. 1000 
Distribution of Respondents 
11 19 52 
(13) (23) (63 ) 
12 2 45 
(20 ) ( 3) (76 ) 
38 4 42 
( 45) (5) (50) 
9 2 30 
(22) (5) (73) 
23 3 41 
(34) (5 ) ( 61) 
17 6 33 
(30) ( 11) (60) 
24 16 25 
(37) (25) (38) 
7 2 49 
(12 ) (3) (85 ) 
6 2 35 
(14) (5) (81) 
5 22 32 
(9 ) (37) (54 ) 
5 1 3 22 
(1 :1 ) ( 32 ) (55) 
15 . 1 18 
(44 ) ( 3 ) (53) 
15 1 17 
( 6 ) ( 3 ) (51) 
Total 
82 
59 
84 
41 
67 
56 
65 
58 
43 
59 
40 
34 
33 
District 
Tangail 
Sylhet 
Total 
Did not 
need 
TABLE 6 . 10 (CONTD . ) 
Less than 
Tk . 1000 
Tk . 1000 
Distribution of Responde nts 
29 
(29 ) 
29 
(54) 
245 
(28 ) 
10 
( 10) 
2 
(4) 
105 
( 12 ) 
60 
(61) 
23 
(43) 
524 
(60 ) 
Note : Figures with i n brackets indicate percentages . 
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Total 
99 
54 
874 
From Table 6 . 10 it can be observed that in fo u r d i stricts ( i . e . 
Mymens i ngh , Pabna , Bogra and Sylhet ), the proportion of farmers declining 
to borrow is 45 per cent , 44 per cent , 46 per cent and 54 per cent respective-
ly e Si milarly , i n four other districts (i.e . Rajshahi , Jessor , Barisal and 
Tangai l ), the proporti on of farmers who did not wan t to borrow is 34 per cent, 
30 per cent , 37 per cent and 29 per cent respectively . In the remaining 
seven districts (i.e . Dinajpur , Rangpur , Kushtia , Patuakhali , Faridpur , 
Noakhali and Khulna ), the percentages of respondents declining to borrow 
are 1 3 , 20 , 22 , 12 , 14 , 9 and 1 3 respect i vely . In other words in seven 
districts the number of respondents wanting Tk . 1000 or less ranges from 
78 per cent to 91 per cent whereas in the first four districts the number 
of respondents wanting to borrow ranges from 46 per cent to 56 per cent. 
This mC1Y sllClCJest hC1t tho number of f,lrmers who (Ire in nC'ccl of lO(ln is loss 
in the first four districts as compared to the second group of four districts 
and third group of seven districts . While it is not possible to pursue 
the matter in detail , there are some interesting similarities within the 
three groupings of regions given above . The first and second group of 
distr i cts may likely belong to surplus districts while the third group may 
belong to deficit destricts . IIowever, further investigation is needed 
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ln order to confirm the above lssue. 
6.2.3 Speculation by the Respondents Regarding the Purpose of Borrowing 
Having analysed the nature of the hypothetical demand for a proposed 
one year loan of up to Tk . 1000 according to farm size, tenurial status 
and regional differences , it will be interesting to look at the purpose, 
for which the respondents wanted to borrow Tk. 1000. It is commonly 
believed th t utilization of borrowed money for productive purposes can 
only ensure increased production on the farm. The reason is that product-
ion loans are in a sense self-liquidating, that lS, theYienable the 
borrower to earn the additional funds needed to repay the loan. One 
major problem with Bangladeshi farmers is that they cannot differentiate 
production credit from investment credit. Lack of understanding of this 
difference not only causes mis-utilization of funds but also affects the 
repayment capacity of the borrowers. Table 6.11 shows the speculation by 
the respondents regarding the purpose for which they would like to borrow 
Tk. 1000. 
From Table 6.11 it can be observed that the majority of the respondents 
(61 per cent ) indicated that they would utilise the amount for production 
purposes. Next in importance , 24 per cent of them speculated that they 
would purchase plough cattle with the amount. One interesting point to 
note is that only . 5 per cent of the respondents indicated that they would 
utilise a portion of the amount for consumption purposes . In other words, 
out of the 629 respondents only 3 indicated that they would spend the 
amount for consumption purposes. This seems quite unrealistic because the 
demand for credit at least for a marginal and small farmer is a composite 
demand, i.e. a demand for both consumption and production purposes . But 
speculation by the respondents regarding their response to consumption 
purpose is far from reality . One explanation of this response ma y b e that 
the respondents know very well that the institutional agencies do not provide 
Farm Size 
Operational 
(acres) 
0 
. 1 - .99 
1 - 2.5 
2 . 5 - 5.0 
5 . 0 - 7.5 
7.5 and above 
Tota l 
Notes: 
TABLE 6.11 
FARMER RESPONSE TO HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ON HOW THEY WOULD USE Tk . 1000 
Purpose + 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Tota l 
Distribution of Respondents 
0 2 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 3 10 
(20) (JO) (10) (10) ( 30) 
0 34 3 0 21 2 3 12 2 0 1 78 
(44) (4) (27) (3 ) (4 ) (15) ( 3 ) (1 ) 
2 116 2 1 41 1 2 9 2 1 2 1 79 
(1 ) (65) (1) ( . 6) (23) ( . 6) (1) (5 ) (1) ( . 6) (1) 
1 121 2 1 44 3 1 12 7 1 7 200 
( . 5 ) ( 61) (1 ) ( . 5) (22) (1) ( . 5 ) (6) (3 ) ( . 5) (3) 
0 63 1 0 24 0 0 2 1 0 1 92 
(68) (1) (26 ) (2 ) (1) (1) 
0 48 0 1 16 0 1 3 0 0 1 70 
(69) (1) (23) (1 ) (4) (1 ) 
3 384 8 3 149 7 7 38 13 2 15 629 
( .5) (61) (1 ) ( . 5 ) (24) (1) (1) (6) (2) ( . 3 ) (2) 
Figures within brackets indicate percentages. 
+ Purpose = (1) Consumption, (2) farm production, (3) Buying land, (4 ) Farm tools, (5) plough cattle, 
(6) Other livestock, (7) Fish culture, (8) Business purpose, (9 ) Repay old debt, \.0 ()I (10) Irrigation machinery, (11) other purposes. 
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loans for consumption purpose, so they did ' not mention their consumption 
needs at all . Another interesting point to note is that although the 
Tk . 1000 was meant for one year and for production expenses, 24 per cent 
of them speculated that they would buy draft animals which means that 
they are unable to differentiate production credit from investment credit. 
IIowever, the preceding analysis indicates that there 1S a great awareness 
among the farm households o f uS1ng borrowed money in a profitable way . 
6 . 2 .4 Results of the Regression Model 
The results of the regression analysis of the model postulated in 
Section 5 . 2 with respect to the hypothetical demand for investment credit 
are presented in Table 6.12 . From Table 6 .1 2 , it can be observed that 
the independent variables of the entire regression exp l ained 52 per cent of 
the observed variation of the expected demand for credit as indicated by the 
-2 coefficient of multiple determination corrected for degrees of freedom (R ). 
The whole regression was significant at a 1 per cent level of probability, 
as suggested by the F value . 
I n dc'Lcrmininy the cr di L requi reme n ts , Llrea owned is one of the mos L 
important factors and the results indicate that the coefficient for the area 
(Xl) is significant as well as having a positive sign. The coefficient for 
area squared (X12) is also significant and has a positive slgn . On the other 
3 hand , the coefficient for area cubed (Xl ) 1S significant but has a negative 
sign . The hypothesised relationship between the stated credit requirements 
and farm Slze 1S clearly confirmed and is further illustrated 1n Figures 6 .1 
and 6 . 2 which show the total credit requirements and marginal credit 
r quircmcn s by [arm size . From Fig . 6 .1 it can be observed that as the 
farm size increases up to 101 acres , the credit requirements also increas es to 
eak at about Tk . 77000 and thereafter declining . Similarly, 1n Fig. 6.2 
as the farm size increases up to about 50 acres, the marginal requirements 
of credit increases to about Tk . lOOO and after that the marginal requirement 
starts declining . In other words , the credit requirements increase at an 
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TABLE 6.12 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EXPECTED DEMAND FOR 
INVESTMENT CREDIT MODEL 
Explanatory Variables X I S (3 Std. Error T Ratio 
Area Xl 448.04 71.46 6.27* 
2 2 2.10 6.42* Area Xl 13.45 
3 3 8 . 58* Area Xl 0.10 0.01 
Area Rented Out X2 
- 642.26 361.79 1.76** 
l\r (' cJ. H~n I (~d Ou l: ? X2 
2 laC) . ()S 26.81 4.10* 
Area Mortgaged out X3 1907.07 1353.99 1.41 
Area mortgaged 2 2 out X3 561 . 866 528.14 1.06 
Area Mortgaged in X 849 . 86 780.67 1.09 
Fish Culture Investment D4 1 2702 . 79 755.10 3.58* 
Irrigation Machinery 
Investment D2 2227 . 22 758.38 2.94* 
Business Purposes D3 3118.14 452.29 6.89* 
Land Purchase D4 1160 .07 732.59 1.58 
Miltch Cow Purchase D5 1384.70 853 . 63 1.62 
Constant (3 701.80 
0 
2 
R = 0 . 53 Std . Error = 5168.92 
-2 
R = 0 . 52 F13 , 677 = 57 . 94* 
D. W. Statistic = 1 . 76 
* significant at 1 per cent level 
** significant at 10 per cent level 
-2 
R = Coefficient of mUltiple determination corrected for degrees of freedom 
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increasing rate until farm Slze of over 40 acres . By Bangladesh standards 
this is a very large farm . The ' turning point ' In the function is at a 
much larger farm Slze than anticipated and implies that for all practical 
purposes , for credit schemes such as the SACP there is a continuously 
accelerating demand for credit as farm size lncreases . 
The coefficient for area rented out (X 2 ) is significant at the 10 per 
cent level and the sign is negative . This was expected because the more 
land rented out , the less likely the farmer will require additional capital 
from outside credit sources . But the coefficient for area rented out squared 
(X22) is significant and the slgn lS positive. One possible explanation 
lS that when renting out gets beyond a certain size it is most likely that 
the farmer is involved in other kinds of activities (such as business) and 
consequently his demand for credit would increase. The turning point in this 
quadratic is at an area of 3 acres rented out. It might be a good idea in 
any follow-up study to develop the model further to allow an interaction 
term between farm size and area rented out . 
While none of the mortgaged variables are significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels of acceptance , it is interesting to note that 
the signs of coefficients of the mortgaged-out variables are the opposite 
to the rented- out coefficients . The coefficients for the area mortgaged 
out imply an ' n ' shaped quadratic curve . On reflection this contrast could 
have been anticipated since there lS a very big difference between renting-
out and mortgaging-out. In the former case the rental provides regular 
income and continues to allow a substantial exercise of ownership control. 
In the latter C0se , control is lost since the slow ' sule ' implies un 
eventual loss of ownership. It is not surprising that this more desperate 
s i l-u0t;on shows 0n initial positive rel<lLion:;hjp betwccn thc cxpccLed c1emand 
for cr dit and farm size. 
Dummy variables were used In this model to take account of the lumpy 
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investments which the respondents indicated as their purpos e of borrowing . 
Not surprisingly the coefficients for all the five dummy variables were 
positive because they are related to farmers who did not wish to have 
credit for such investments . +hose requiring credit for business purposes 
shifted the curve most , followed by fish culture and irrigation machinery. 
These were the only significant dummy variable coefficients . 
In order to test the incidence of auto-correlation (although ln cross-
s ctional data it is very unlikely to encouter such problem) the Durbin-
Watson statistic has been calculated which indicates that it is in the 
' indecisive ' range and so not much can be said about the presence of positive 
serial correlation ln the errors . But the value of Durbin- Watson statistic 
and inspection of the distribution of the residual values suggested regional 
differences . Similarly , the problem of multi-colinearity between the 
explanatory variables was not encountered as can be seen from the simple 
correlation matrix which is presented in Appendix Dl to D3. 
With q view to testing whether there are regional difference~/it was 
decided to apply the model to two different cross section units of the total 
observation . The 15 districts were divided into two groups on the basis 
of the proportion of respondent's requiring credit in the districts. The 
first group comprises 9 districts where the percentage of respondents who 
did not wish to borrow ranged from 3 per cent to 19 per cent. The second 
group consists of six districts where the percentage of respondents did not 
want to borrow ranged from 27 per cent to 54 per cent. In other words, 1n 
the second group of districts the credit requirement 1S markedly less in 
comparison to he first group of dis ricts. 7\l[ho 11<]11 l-hi s 1<.il1(l of qrollpillq 
is not scientific it is believed that it can show the predicting power of 
thc pos tll1a tcd model . 
The results of the estimated regression mode l with respect to the sub-
sam Ie (grou one) are presented in Table 6 . 13 . 
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Tl\B LE 6 .13 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT IN NINE DISTRICTS 
Explanatory Variables X i S Std. Error T Ra tio 
Area Xl 505 . 59 83 . 66 6.04* 
2 2 Area Xl 12 . 16 2 . 24 5 . 43* 
3 3 l\rea Xl 0 . 09 0.01 9 . 00* 
Area rented out X -1039 . 16 546.68 1.90** 2 
rented 2 2 Area out X2 120.13 34.27 3.51* 
Area mortgaged out X 2509 . 54 1520.77 1 . 65** 3 
mortgaged 2 2 Area out X3 - 762 . 99 563.57 1.35 
Area mortgaged In X4 708.90 865 . 81 0.82 
Investment In fish culture Dl 2491 .7 8 963 . 95 2.58* 
Investment in Irrigation 
Machinery D 3011.65 1122 . 07 2 . 68* 2 
Business Purposes D3 3237 .14 537 . 37 6 . 02* 
Buying Land D4 831 . 33 809 . 01 1.03 
Miltch Cow Purchase D5 482.92 938.98 0 . 51 
Constan't S 803.55 
0 
2 R = 0 . 57 F13 , 465 = 46 . 64* 
-2 
R = 0 . 55 N = 479 
D. W. Statistic = 1.79 
* signific ant at 1 p e r c e nt l e vel 
** siCJni fi ,llll. c1t ] 0 p ( r cC' nt l e ve l 
N is the numb e r of cas e s . 
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The regress10n on the selected n1ne distri~ts explained 55 per cent of the 
observed variation in the expected demand for credit as indicated by the 
corrected R2 which is somewhat better than our earlier results (Table 6 .1 2) 
This also suggests that if we could incorporate oth~r important variables 
in the equation , the entire regression might have explained more of the 
observed variation in the expected demand for credit . 
2 
The regression coefficients of area (Xl) ' area squared (Xl ) and area 
cubed (X
1
3 ) have the same signs and degree of significance as the earlier 
pooled results . The sign of the area mortgaged out (X ) coefficient is still 3 
positive but 1S now significant at - the 10 per cent probability level . This 
confirms the suggestion already made that those who mortgaged out land need more 
credit the more they mortgage out. I n a vi llage community a farmer only 
mortgages out land only when he has got no other alternative sources from 
which he can borrow and meet his credit requirements . The mortgaging of 
land might be said to be ' credi t of last resort '. Therefore , in order to 
redeem the mortgaged out l and (i t is us ually not poss i ble to repay the 
stipulated amount at one time from his meagre surplus) from the mortgagee 
he requires a lump sum of money . As a result his demand for credit is 
likely to increase as the area mortgaged out increases. The regress10n 
2 
coefficient of mortgaged out squared (X ) was negative but not significant . 
3 
The sign for the coefficient of mortgaged in (X ) was positive but not 
4 
significantly different from zero . Similarly the sign for the coefficients 
of all the shifter variables were positive but only three were significant: 
investment in fish cul.ture , irrigation machinery and business which were 
0.lso similoL Lo Lh e ei1rli r results o n he pooled di1to set . 
With the same dependent and independent variables, the results of the 
regression analysis pertaining to the second sub-sample representing 
districts where a much larger percentage of farmers did not want to borrow 
are presented in Table 6 . 14 . - 2 On the basis of R , the explanatory variables 
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Tl\BLL G. lll 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ~N~LYSIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT IN SIX DISTRICTS 
Explanatory Variable X ' s B Std . Error T Ratio 
Area Xl 1153 . 23 364 . 12 3 . 17* 
2 2 Area Xl 93 . 85 34.66 2 . 71* 
3 3 Ar a Xl 3 . 02 0.84 3 . GO* 
Area rented out X2 -1666 . 57 727 . 31 2 . 29** 
rented 2 l\rea out X2 
2 343 . 04 88 . 72 3.87* 
Area mortgaged out X3 - 810 .1 6 6184 . 60 0.13 
2 Area mortgag d out X3 
2 638 . 61 8023 . 62 0.08 
Area mortgaged In X
4 
692 . 86 1984.07 0.35 
Fish Culture Investment 0 1 3584 .7 8 1160.19 3.09* 
Irrigation Machinery 
Investment D2 1411.17 1034.68 1.36 
Business Purposes 0 3 1615 . 48 850.71 1.90*** 
Land Purchase 0 4 1399 . 34 1905.96 0.73 
Mi1tch Cow Purchase 0 5 7118 . 73 2399.18 2 . 97 * 
Constant S - 244 .18 
0 
2 0.50 R = 
N = 212 
-2 R = 0 . 47 
D. W. Statistics = 1 . 73 
* significant at 1 per cent l e vel 
** significant at 5 per cent l evel 
*** significant at 10 per cent level 
N lS the nwnber of cases In the sub- sample . 
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of the model explains 47 per cent of the total variation 1n the dependent 
variable (C). This result is not exactly similar to the earlier results 
(sub-sample one) which indicated that the sign for the area variable (Xl) 
has changed . The coefficient for area (Xl) is positive and significant 
2 
while the sign for area squared (Xl ) 1S negative but significant. 
Similarly , the sign for area cubed (X
1
3 ) was positive and significant . 
2 
In our earlier results it was revealed that the sign for area squared (Xl ) 
was positive but the sign for area cubed (X 3) was negative which indicated 
1 
that the demand for credit increases at an increasing rate up to a certain 
range (45 acres) but after that it starts decreasing . But in this case, 
the demand for credit increases at a decreasing rate up to a range of 
20 acres but thereafter it starts increasing at an increasing rate. 
One important point to note here is that the demand for credit pattern 
of the pooled and sub-samples are the same up to a certain range of 
acreage as can be seen from Figure 6.3. From Figure 6 . 3 it can be observed 
that up to 8 acres of landholding the amount of credit demanded is about 
Tk 5 thousand. In Bangladesh standard this 1S quite reasonable because 
the average size of farms is about 2 . 62 acres and 97 per cent of the rural 
households owned up to 8 acres of land . Therefore, as the land Slze 
increases beyond 8 acres the pattern of the demand for credit also changes. 
In case of sub-sample one, larger farmers wanted less credit whereas in 
case of sub-sample two, larger farmer wanted more credit than small farmer 
and cons quenLly the shape of the curve is increasing at an increasing rate. 
This suggests l1at the overall demand for credit pattern 1S different 1n 
lhis group of disLricts 1n compar ison to the first group of districts for 
the largest farms . 
Similarly , the slgn for area mortgaged out (X ) was negative but not 
3 
significant whil e the sign for area mortqaged out squared (X 2) was positive 
3 
but not significantly different from zero. The coefficients of all the 
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' shifter ' variables were positive slgns but . only three were significant. 
The significant dummy variables which shifted the curve most was fish culture 
followed by investment in milch cow and busine ss purposes . The overall 
regress10n r~sults of this sub- sample indicates that the demand for credit 
varies due to regional differences which we have hypothesised . 
In order to t~st wh~ther the estimated relationship of the two sub-
samples differs significantly , we have conducted Chow test using the 
following formula (Koutsoyiannis , 1977 , p . 166) . 
* 2 F = [I:ep 
with VI = K and V2 = (n l + n 2 - 2K) degrees of freedom. 
Where , 
* F 1S the observed F ratio 
2 
ep the pooled residual squared (Total sample) 
2 
e l th~ 
r es idual square of the first sub-sample 
- 2 
the residual of the second sub-sample e 2 square 
n l the number of cases 1n the first 
sub-sample 
n 2 the number of cases in the second sub- sample 
K the number of explanatory variables including the constant. 
The result of the test is shown as under : 
F*14 , 677 = 2 . 77> 2 . 13 
The result shows that the observed F* ratio is greater than the tabulated 
1" ratio at a 1 l)cr cent probability level whi c h implic~s thi..lL thc two 
regrcsslon c-t im~tcs differ significantly . In other words, the demcJ.nd 
[or credit differs significantly due to regional differences which were 
ide ntified by the proportio n of farme rs who did not want credit. This 
s upports the hypoLhcs is as proposed in Chapter 5 t hat rcqional differences 
in credit d emand arc important. 
1 09 
It is clear from Figure 6.3 that all three curves are like the tails 
of a whip emanating from a single ' handle'. The handle suggests a consistent 
lineari ty in the demand for credi t arn.ong farms of less than about 8 acres. 
with a view to examining this linear relationship between the damend for 
credit and farm size up to 8 acres, it was decided to apply both the non-
linear and a linear model to all the observations (up to 8 acres) as well 
as to the two sub-samples comprlslng nine districts and six districts 
respectively . The results of the estimated non-linear regresslon model are 
presented in Appendix E. 
The results of the regresslon analysis revealed that the coefficient 
of area variables (i.e, Xl' 2 3 Xl & Xl ) cease to be significant. The co-
2 
efficients for area rented out (X2 ) and area rented out squared (X2 ) were 
not significantly different from zero except in sub-sample one. The sign 
for area mortgaged out (X
3
) was negative but significant while the sign for 
area mortgaged out squared (X32 ) was positive and significant. 
In the sub- sample one (9 districts ) the sign for area mortgaged out (X 3 ) 
was negative but not significant while the sign for area mortgaged out 
2 
squared (X
3 
) was positive and significant . The coefficient of mortgaged 
out variable ex3) was not significant in the sub-sample two (6 districts). 
None of the coefficients of area mortgaged in (X 4 ) was significant. 
All the dummy variables used in the model were significant except In 
sub-sample one (9 districts) where land purchased and milch cows purchased 
was not significant. This implies that the demand for credit was also 
influenced by the various purposes for which they would like to borrow. 
In order to explore further the hypothesised linear relationship between 
the expected demand for credit and farm size (up to 8 acres), a linear version 
of the model has been applied to all observations as well as to the sub-
samples . The results are presented in Appendix F. 
The regression coefficients of are (Xl) are now highly significant In 
all three cases . This confirms the evidence presented In Figure 6.3 
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suggesting a linear relationship between the demand for credit and land-
holdings up to 8 acres . 
The co-effi cients for area rented out variables (X2 ) were negative but 
not significantly different from zero while the coefficients for area 
.. 
mortgaged out (X 3) were positive but significant except in six districts 
(sub-sample two) where X3 is negative but not significant. Similarly none 
of the coefficients for area mortgaged in variables (X4 ) were significant. 
The coeff i cients for all the dummy variables were positive and signif-
icant except milch cows in sub-sample one. These results further suggest 
that the demand for credit is also influenced by the purpose for which they 
wanted to borrow. 
In order to test whether the estimated relationship of the two sub-
samples differ significantly in both the non-linear and linear models, a 
second chow test was performed; the results (given in Appendix F) revealed 
* that the observed F ratio was not significantly different from zero. This 
implies that the demand for credit does not differ due to regional differences 
for farms up to 8 acres of land holding. However, the coefficients for 
mortgaged out (X 3 ) and mortgaged in (X 4 ) variables suggests that there are 
regional differences which need further investigation. 
2 The very low R of these models highlights the lack of data for a full 
model of the demand for credit. Other studies suggest that demographic 
data and information on off-farm employment would improve the model subst-
antially [Asaduzzman and Hossain, 19741. 
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6 . 3 . 1 Current Borrowing and Purpose 
In the survey information was collected from the respondents with 
respect to their current borrowing . If current borrowing is taken as an 
indication of the annual credit requirement of a farming household , then 
out of the total sample of 874 only 144 or 16 per cent of the respondents 
stated that they had borrowed during the prevlous year . However, it can 
be argued that borrowing does not always reflect the demand for credit of 
a farming household . A low proportion of st~ted borrowing could have been 
the result of one or more factors . It may be that some cultivators did 
not need to borrow because their expenses were low or occasions of 
expenditure were few in that particular year . Others might not have 
borrowed as they had sufficient resources of their own and most importantly, 
cultivators might have needed to borrow but could not because the potential 
lenders did not consider them credit worthy . Finally , respondents 
may not have been prepared to reveal their true borrowing situation . 
Therefore; low proportion of borrowing families does not necessarily indicate 
that there is less demand for credit in rural Bangladesh. 
With this data set a tabular analysis has been carried out to examlne 
the na ure of borrowing by farm Slze which can be seen from Table 6.15. 
From Table 6 . 15 it can be observed that 57 per cent of the respondents 
borrowed less than Tk . 500 while 22 per cent have borrowed to the extent of 
Tk . 500 to Tk . lOOO . On the other hand , 15 per cent of the respondents have 
borrowed to the extcnt of Tk . lOOl to Tk . 2000 and the rcmaining 6 ]Jcr ccnt 
have borrowed Tk . 200l nnd above . Concentrating on the relation between 
borrowing and farm sizc, it appcars that thosc who havc zcro operational 
holding , 80 per cent of them borrowed less than Tk . 500 while those farms 
with less than one acre of operational holding (near landless according to 
our definition) 72 er cent borrowed less than Tk.500 and 20 per cent 
borrowed to the extent of Tk.500 to Tk . lOOO . On the other hand, marginal 
Farm Size 
Operational 
(acres) 
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Tabl e 6 . 15 
ACTUAL BORROWING BY FARM SIZE 
Amount Borrowed In Taka 
Less than 
500 
500 - 1000 1001-2000 20r.l-above Total 
Distribution of Respondents 
0 
0 . 1 - . 99 
1 - 2.5 
2 . 5 - 5 . 00 
5 . 00-7. 5 
7 . 5 and above 
Total 
t1 
(80 
18 
(72) 
30 
(73) 
22 
(48 ) 
5 
(36) 
3 
(23) 
82 
(57) 
0 
5 
(20) 
6 
(15) 
14 
( 30) 
5 
(36) 
2 
(15) 
32 
(22) 
1 
(20) 
1 
4) 
4 
( 10) 
7 
(15) 
3 
(21) 
5 
(46 ) 
22 
(15) 
Note : Figures within brackets indicate percentages 
0 
1 
4) 
1 
2) 
3 
7) 
1 
7) 
2 
(15) 
8 
6) 
S 
25 
41 
46 
14 
13 
144 
and small farmers (those with between 1 - 2 . 5 acres and 2 . 5-5 acres) 73 and 
48 per cent respectively borrowed less than Tk. 500. Similarly , medium and 
large farmers (those with between 5.0-7.5 acres and 7.5 acres and above) 
36 per cent and 23 per cent respectively borrowed less than Tk.SOO . These results 
clearly indicatE that larger borrowing is associated with bigger size of 
operational holdlng while smaller borrowing is associated with below 5 acres 
of operational holding . One possible ex lanation is that the only security 
which cultivator can offer to the lender is his land . Since marginal and 
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small farmers possess less land as compared with medium and large farmers , 
therefore, they are unable to obtain more amount from the potential lender . 
However , these results roughly indicate that the demand for credit is not 
uniform; it varies according to the size of holding. 
It may be interesting to look into the factors influencing the 
borrowing of the farming households. From Table 6.16 it can be observed 
that 35 per cent of the respondents borrowed for production purposes 
while 24 per cent did not mention any specific reason for which they 
borrowed. On the other hand, 22 per cent of the r espondents borrowed for 
family consumption purposes. As regards the purpose of borrowing by farm 
size , it appears that 51 per cent of marginal farmers borrowed for production 
purposes and 27 per cent for consumption purposes. On the other hand, 
37 per cent of small farmers borrowed for production purposes while 20 per 
cent for consumption p urposes . We have also suggested in Chapter 2 that 
the demand for credit of a marginal and small farmer is a composite demand, 
-i.e ., demand for consumption as well as for production purposes. Similarly, 
50 per cent of medium farmers borrowed for production purposes while only 
7 per cent for consumption purposes . On the other hand, only 23 per cent 
of large farmers borrowed for production purposes and 23 per cent borrowed 
for buying land . Interestingly , about 31 per cent of larger farmers 
borrowed for other purposes . However , from the overall results it appears 
that there is a tendency among the small and marginal farmers in utilizing 
borrowc1 mOl1cy for productive purposes . 
Farm Size 
Operational 
(acres) 
0 
0 . 1 - . 99 
1 - 2 . 5 
2 . 5 - 5 . 0 
5 . 0 - 7 . 5 
7.5 and above 
Total 
1 
4 
(80 ) 
6 
(24) 
11 
(27) 
9 
(20 ) 
1 
7) 
1 
8) 
32 
(22) 
2 
0 
3 
(12) 
21 
(51 ) 
17 
(37) 
7 
(50) 
3 
(23) 
51 
(35) 
TABLE 6.:6 
PURPOSE OF BORROWING BY FARM SIZE 
Purpose + 
3 4 5 
Distribution of Respondents 
0 
0 
0 
6 
(13) 
0 
3 
(23) 
9 
6) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
7) 
0 
1 
( • 7) 
0 
2 
8) 
2 
5) 
6 
(13 ) 
3 
(21) 
2 
(15) 
15 
( 10) 
Note: Figures within brackets indicate percentages . 
6 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 ) 
0 
0 
1 
( . 7) 
7 
1 
(20) 
14 
(56 ) 
7 
(17) 
7 
(15) 
2 
(14) 
4; 
(31) 
35 
(24) 
+ Purpose = (1) Consumption, (2) farm production, (3) buying land, (4) farming implements, 
(5) buying draft animal, (6) buying miltch cow and (7) other purposes . 
Total 
5 
25 
41 
46 
14 
13 
144 
I-' 
I-' 
.t:> 
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Clll\PTL:H 7 
SUMMARY l\ND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study an attempt has been made to evaluate the performance of 
the Tk .1000 million Special Agricultural Credit Programme of Bangladesh with 
r espect to its stated objectives . In recent years , the government has 
realised that agricultural development in general and increasing food graln 
production ln particular, depends upon the millions of small farming 
households who are directly involved in agricultural production . But 
small farmers in Bangladesh general l y are very poor and consequently 
in most of the cases they cannot meet their working capital r equirements 
from their meagre farm income. Historically, the credit requirements 
of small farmers are met primarily by the informal sources which also 
charges exhorbitant rates of interest . On the other hand, whatever the 
limited amount of credit supplied by the institutional agencies to the 
rural sector was mainly preempted by the medium and large farmers who are a 
polit ically a nd socially powerful group in the society . The realization of 
this fact has prompted the government to launch the Tk.lOOO million Special 
Agricultural Credit Programme (SACP) since early 1977. The main objective 
of this prog ramme is to provide credit for genuine productive purposes 
mainly to the small , marginal farmers and share -croppers who hithe rto had 
had practically no access to institutional sources of credit . Following 
the initiation of the SAC Programme a surve y was carried out to investigate 
whethe r, in actual fact , the loans h ad gone to the smaller, more disadvantaged 
farmers . The survey was ln two parts : the main s ect ion , or what we have 
called the Primal Survey , wa s concerned with those who had participated 
in the SACP . Here farmers were interviewed and a r eport entitled 
' Memorandam ' presented the major findings . The second section of the survey 
was the Dual of the first in the sense that it collected data from a sample 
of 8 74 farm households who did not participa e in the programme , covering 
15 districts , out of the 19 districts of the country . This study is 
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concerned with Dual section of the survey for its impoytance 111 under-
standing the problem . It was believed that not only was the analysis of 
this rather unusual sample important but also that a comparison of the 
resul ts wi th primal survey report would ShOiv the ar;tua 1 performal1 ce of 
the S)\Cr . 
In concentrating on the dual survey , it was hypothesised that knowl edge 
about the programme is independent of farm Slze , l . e. , small , medium and 
large farmers have equal knowledge about the programme . The results of 
our analysis revealed that there was no systematic bias against the 
small farmers with respect to the knowledge of the programme but there was 
a significant location specific bias . This implies that the information 
media involved in the programme were successful in disseminating knowledge 
about the programme and its objective (presumably) except in two districts 
of Tangail and Sylhet . 
The main objective of the programme lS to provide credit to small, 
-
marginal farmers and share-croppers with easy terms and conditions. 
[n ordel' to study the char<Jcteristics 0 f those ]'espondents \vho 
applied for a loan but did not get one and those who did not apply, it was 
hypothesised that there was no significant difference In the mean land 
holding between the two groups of farming households . The results of the 
analysis revealed that there was indeed a significant difference between the 
mean si zes of landholcJing of the t\vO groups of farming households. The Tesults 
implied that those who applied for a loan but did not receive one , are 
mostly smaller landholding class in comparison to tllose who did not apply. 
These resul s are, as we shall see , confirmed by tIle results of the Primal 
surveY , are clearly contrary to the stated objective of the programme. 
In rural Bangladesh it lS not expected that every farming household 
needs production credit. But it is also truc that majority of the small 
farmers due Lo Lhcir weLlk [inuncial position necc1 more assisLancc in obtaining 
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Cr dit 1n comparlson to large and surplus producing farmers . Consequently 
it was hypothesised that there was no significant difference in the mean 
landholding of those respondents who applied for a loan and those who did 
not apply because they did not need credit . Not ~~rprisingly, the results 
obtained show that there was a significant difference in the mean landholding 
between the two groups of farming households. This further confirmed that 
those who applied for a loan but did not get one were mostly small farmers. 
To study the characteristics of those households who applied for a 
loan but did not get one and those who did not apply because they believed 
that they would not get credit from the SACP , it was again hypothesised 
that there was no significant difference in the mean landholding between 
the two groups of respondents. The results of the analysis revealed 'no 
difference ' in the mean landholding between the two groups . These results 
clearly indicate that those who applied for a loan but did not get one and 
those who did not apply because they believed that they would not get 
credit belong to the same class of farming hous e holds. 
Although under the SACP , provision was made to provide credit with 
simplified procedures , it was observed that about 26 per cent of the 
respondents did not apply for a loan for 'other reasons ' . It may mean 
that this group of farmers could not fulfil the so-called relaxed formalities 
in order to get a loan . with a vi ew to analysing the characteristics of 
this group of farming households, it was hypothesised that there was no 
significant difference in the mean land holding between those whu applied 
for a loan and those who did not apply for 'other reasons' . The results 
of the analysis revealed that there lS no significant difference in the 
mean land holding between these two groups of farming households which 
further c011firms that those respondents who did not apply for a loan for 
' other reasons ' are mostly small farmers. 
The above results of the analyses clearly indicate that those farming 
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households who applied for a loan but did not get one and those who did 
not apply because they believed that they would not get credit and also 
those who did not apply for other reasons , are mostly small farmers . 
A comparison of the results with respect to the primal survey (that lS, 
those who did participate in the programme ) will further strengthen the 
conclllsions of this thesjs for the report st.1.tes that 
"Relative to the national land ownership pattern, 
the data from the sample of borrowers show a 
disproportionate representation of ' large ' farmers 
. . . . . . .. there is little doubt that farmers owning 
upwards of 5 acres account for 50 per cent or more 
of the amount disbursed and overdue for repayment 
under the programme" (Memorandum, 1978). 
Therefore r on the basis of the results obtained from the primal survey 
and our compari son o f t h e pri mal an d dua l r esul t s, we can firml y conclude 
that the SACP fa iled t o f ulfil i t s stat ed ob jective o f providin g credit to 
small, margina l farme r s an d share - cropper s whi ch consists of an overwhelming 
majority of the fal~ing households of rural Bangladesh. 
In this study an attempt was made to analyse the nature of the demand 
for credit among the farming households on the basis of the information 
collected in the survey . with the available information it was decided to 
analyse the various factors wh i ch might influence the demand for production 
credit by postulating a model . As indicated in Chapter 6 , some specific 
limitation in the data set precluded the testing of a formal model . 
Instead , tabular and regression analyses were carried out and the results 
supported tll~ hypothesis that credit requirement varies according to farm 
-
size by increasing rapidly as farm size increases but after a certain range 
it tails off with further increases in farm size . The results of the 
tabular analysis revealed that 44 per cent and 35 per cent of large (owning 
more than 7 . 5 acres of operational holding) and medium farmers (those 
with between 5 and 7 . 5 acres of operational holdings) respectively did 
not need production credit . On the other hand, 26 per cent and 22 per c e nt 
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of small and marginal farmers respectively 'did not wish to borrow . Th e 
non-viable farmers, those with less than one acre of operational holdings 
(i . e . near landless according to our definition ) 15 per cent d ec lined to 
borrow while those with zero operational holding 41_per cent did not wish to 
borrow . This clearly demonstrates that the demand for production credit lS 
not uniform among the farming households . 
It was also hypothesised that the demand for credit also varles 
according to the tenurial status of a farmer , that is , owner farmer , 
owner-cum-tenant and tenant farmer . The results of our analysis revealed 
that 31 per cent of owner farmers , 22 per cent of owner- cum-tenant and 
only 6 per cent of p ure tenant respectively declined to borrow . This 
roughly indicates that credit requirements do vary according to the 
tenurial status of a farmer and that credit need is higher in case of 
tenant farmer as compared with owner and owner - cum- tenant farmer. 
Regional variation is likely to influence the demand for credit 
and our results support this hypothesis . The results obtained from the 
study revealed that in four districts , i . e. , Myme nsingh, Pabna, Bogra 
and Sylhe t , the proportion of farmers declining to borrow ranges from 
44 per cent to 56 per cent while in another four districts, i. e . Rajshahi , 
Jessor , Barisal and Tangail, the proportion of farmers who did not want 
to borrow ranges from 29 per cent to 37 per cent . Similarly, in the 
remaining seven districts, i . e ., Dinajpur , Rangpur , Kushtia , Patuakhali, 
Faridpur , Noakhali and Khu11l t.1, the percentage of r esponde nts who declined to 
borrow ranges from 9 per cent to 20 per cent . This may suggest that in the 
[irsL our disLri cts Lbe credit requir ment is less in compClrison to the 
second and third group of districts . 
In this study an attemp was made to analyse the speculat i on by the 
responde nts regarding the purpose for which they want ed to borrow, Tk . 1000. 
The results obtained show that 61 per cent of the r espondents indicated that 
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they would utilize the amount for production purposes. Surprisingly, 
only . 5 per cent of the respondents indicated that they would utilize a 
portion of the amount for consumption purposes . One possible explanation 
of this response may be that the respondents know very well that the 
institutional agences do not provide loans for consumption purposes, 
therefore , they did not mention their consumption need at all . However, 
the results indicated that the majority of the farmers know how to use 
the borrowed money in a productive way . 
The regression analysis confirmed the findings of the tabular analysis 
In a more precise form although the analysis is subject to a number of 
limitations because of the non- availability of some important variables 
which the questionnaire did not ask in the survey. 
The most important factor which influences the demand for credit is 
the amount of land a person holds and the results of our model pertaining 
to the whole set of observations strongly support the hypothesis that the 
demand for credit varies according to farm size by increasing rapidly as 
the farm size incre ases but after a certain range it tails off with 
further increases in farm size . Thus , the coefficient for area (Xl)' 
area squared (XI2) were positive and significant while the coefficient for 
area cubed (X I
3 ) was negative (all were highly significant). However, 
the ' turning point ' in the function (at about 45 acres) was at a much large r 
farm size (by Bangladesh standard) than expected . This implies that for 
all practical purposes for a c redit scheme with objectives similar to 
SACP, there is a continuously increasing demand for inves tme nt credit as 
r cl. ' 111 . . .:L~'.l~ 111 1 ·(~ l1Sl~S . 
Our findings also suggest that the demand for credit lS also 
influenced by the tenurial status of a farmer . We found a negatively 
significant coefficient for area r ented out variable (X
2
) and a positively 
') 
significant coeff i c ient for area rented out squared (X2~)' This ' u ' shaped 
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quadratic function implies that the more l~nd rented out, the less likely 
it is that the farmer will require additional credit but as the renting out 
gets beyond a certain Slze (in this case about 3 acres) the demand for 
credit would be likely to increase again . It is suggested that in any 
follow up study might develop the model further by introducing an 
interaction term between farm Slze and area rented out. 
The coefficient for mortgaged out and mortgaged in variables , although 
not significant , shows a positive relationship between the expected demand 
for credit and the area mortgaged . Our findings also revealed that 
there is a great demand for credit for pisi - culture , irrigation machinery 
and business purposes . The positively significant coefficient for 0 3 , 
l . e ., for business purpose partly i ndicate the stagnation of the agricul-
tural sector . 
To analyse the regional differencs which also influence the demand for 
credit , the regression model was applied to two different sub-samples, 
based on Glustering Districts in terms of the percentage of farmers not 
wishing to borrow . The results of the model with respect to the sub-sample 
of nine districts with a high percentage of farmers wanting to borrow 
were similar to the results for the pooled observation except that the 
coefficient of the area mortgaged out variable (X 3 ) was positive and 
significant . This implies that those who mortgaged out land need more 
credit and this firmly supports the hypothesis that tenurial status of a 
farmer also influences the demand for credit . The results of the model 
with respect to the second sub-sample and subsequent Chow test r e vealed that 
~ CJionCll diff rcnccs do influence the demZlno for credit. 
The overall results of the model pertaining to pooled observation and 
sub-samples demonstrate that the demand for credit pattern is the same up 
to a certain range of land holding (about 8 acres) and up to this range 
there is virtually a linear relationship between the amoun of credit demanded 
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and the Slze of holding . . . In Bangl adesh Slnce an overwhelming majority 
(about 88 per cent) of rural households owned up to 8 acres of land, 
therefore , for all practical purposes , any credit programme such as SACP 
should be designed to serve the farming households who own below 8 acres 
of land . 
Finally , In this study an attempt was made to look (on tabular basis) 
into the nature and factors influencing the actual borrowing (as opposed 
to their desire to borrow ) among the farming households . The results 
revealed that the amount of borrowing varies according to farm Slze and 
larger farmers borrowed more amount of money as compared with small and 
marginal farmers . As regards the purpose of borrowing it appears that 
while the landless and very small farmers borrow mainly for consumption 
purposes , the majority of the small farmers borrowed for production 
purposes which is very important for increasing the productivity of this 
sector . 
7 . 1 Policy Considerations 
In this study emphasis has been placed on two problems; first 
to evaluate the performance of the Tk . 1000 million Special Agricultural 
Credit Programme from the non-recipient ' s point of view and s econd ly, to 
analyse the nature of the demand for credit among the farming hous eholds. 
On the basis of tabular and statistical analysis and subject to the 
limitations imposed by the availability and nature of the data, the following 
policy implicat ions emerge from the study : 
Agricul t ural Credit Programme has failed to fulfil it s stated objective 
in spite of the government ' s keen interes t in serving the small, marginal 
farmers and share-croppers who constitute an overwhelming majority of the 
farming households . One of the main drawbacks of the SACP is that either 
its stated objectives were never communicated clearly to the financial 
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institutions charged with its impleme ntation, or the financial institutions 
did not glve much emphasis to the stated objective of the Programme at the 
time of credit disbursement . As a result the power structure of the village 
society , that is , the medium and large farmers , were able to get a maJor 
share from the amount disbursed , although in principle, they should have 
no claim on the credit provided from the SACP. It is therefore suggested 
that the SACP should be renamed the 'Special Agricultural Credit Programme 
for Small Farmers ' and necessary legis l ation should be passed so that no 
farmer beyond 5 acres of operational holding (about 89 per cent of the 
farming households are below 5 acres of operational holdings) can get a 
loan from this Special Programme . Otherwise , under the present agrarlan 
structure , it is very doubtful whether credit will reach to the small 
farming class . The study has shown that about 26 per cent of the 
respondents could not apply for a loan from the SACP due to cumbersome 
formalities , although provlslon was made under the programme to simplify 
the loan procedures to a great extent. It lS therefore suggested that 
all paper work for small , marginal farmers and share - croppers should be 
done either by credit disbursing agencies or other officials involved 
under the programme . In order to overcome the paper work formalities 
it is further suggested that a borrower ' s 'Credit Pass Book' system should 
be introduced , which would go a long way towards solving this problem. 
(2) The study has shown that the demand for credit among the 
farming households is not uniform and it varies according to the size of 
holding . Moreover, the demand for credit also varles according to the 
tenurial status of a farmer . Those who rented out land needed l ess 
credit while those who mortgaged out land needed more credit. It is 
therefore suggested that in disbursing credit from the institutional 
sources due consideration should be given to the actual needs of the 
varlOUS categories of farming households. 
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(3) The study has revealed that the demand for credit also 
var1es due to regional differences . In some districts, the c r edit 
requirement is less , while 1n other districts there is a great demand for 
credit . Although we were not able to pursue this matter in g r eat detail, 
it might be advisable for the Central Bank to exp l ore the causes of 
regional variation in more detail . 
(4) Finally , while the Bank 1S to be congratulated in under-
taking his unusulll , if not unlquc , survey of the ' dUlll' groups of farmers , 
that is , those who were not covered by the credit programme , the data actually 
collected had several ' errors of omission '. Key variables nece ssary for 
a full explanation of the demand for credit were missing. Such omissions 
might have been avoided had the Consultants who designed the survey 
questionnaires started with a reasonable theoretical model in mind. 
Certainly any follow-up surveys should include some of the essential 
demographic information on farm households that was omitted from this 
survey . 
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1\.PPENDIX 1\. 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS PEOPLE IN D1\.CC1\. 
Year/Months General 
19 71-7 2 1 21 . 52 
19 72-7 3 181. 51 
19 73-7 4 252 . 48 
19 74-7 5 407 . 58 
19 75-7 6 380 .14 
1976-77 382 . 46 
19 77-7 8 440 . 64 
1978-7 9 : 
Jul y 461 . 37 
August 475 . 37 
September 478 . 55 
October 489 . 91 
November 485 . 84 
December 482 . 37 
January 479 . 27 
February 476 . 37 
March 480 . 87 
(BASE 1969- 70=100 ) 
Food 
122 . 03 
1 84 . 73 
26 3. 48 
469 . 55 
384 . 58 
366. 6 7 
431 . 21 
445 . 65 
461. 72 
46 7. 02 
48 7. 31 
478 . 58 
468.33 
452 . 04 
442.04 
443 . 73 
Fucl a nd 
Lighting 
133 .4 5 
191 .7 5 
249 . 56 
358 .67 
37 0 . 07 
391.04 
401 . 01 
410 . 22 
413 . 5 7 
418 . 22 
415 . 61 
417 . 29 
418 . 96 
441 . 08 
438 . 11 
466 . 73 
Housing Clothing 
a nd and 
Household Footwear 
Requisites 
108 . 66 161 . 50 
1 32 . 06 231 . 75 
160 . 65 355.33 
268 . 22 413 . 42 
405 . 82 380 . 00 
47 6 . 40 386 . 98 
563 . 69 466 . 20 
622 . 54 500 . 35 
628 . 21 512 . 43 
629 . 88 509 . 97 
632 . 39 511 . 84 
634 . 31 513 . 25 
638 . 40 515 . 00 
668 . 20 515 . 36 
670 . 62 511 . 72 
681 . 39 507 . 27 
ource : I3LlI1<jlLlc1csh !3urCiJU of StLltisLics . 
Miscell-
aneous 
124 . 30 
1 78 . 46 
236 . 67 
344 . 57 
357 . 57 
364 . 81 
395 . 21 
407 . 43 
424 . 47 
425 . 16 
426 . 88 
427 . 25 
432 . 78 
435 . 89 
447.67 
453 . 04 
l\PPP.NDIX 8 
BANGLADESH BANK FARM SURVEY 
Questionnaire for Thos e Who Did Not Receive Loan 
From Tk . 1000 Million Special Agricultural Credit Programme 
District Thana 
union .. . ............. . .............. Village . . .. . . .. . .... . . . . . . .. .... . . . 
Q;l; Did you own any cropland , pastureland , fish ponds or orchards 
during the period April, 1977 to March 31 , 1978? 
. . . . . . .. Yes . . . . . .. No . 
If the answer lS ' Yes ' 
Nature of Real Estate Area In Decimal 
Crop Land 
Pasture Land 
Orchard 
Fish Pond 
Other 
Total 
Q.2 . Did you mortgage in/mortgage out and or rent in/rent out any 
land (i . e . crop land, pasture land, orchard, or fish pond) 
during the period April 1, 1977 to March 31 , 1978? 
(Mortgage in/Mortgage out) 
(Rent in/Rent out) 
If the answer is ' Yes' 
.. .. ... . Yes ....... . .. No 
........ Yes ...... . ... No 
Nature o[ Land Mortgage Rent 
In Out In Out 
(Area in Decimal) 
Crop Land 
Pasture Lond 
Orchard 
Fish Pond 
Other 
Total 
134 
Q. 3 . Did you know that banks are glvlng crop loan under the Tk.1000 
Million Special Agricultural Credit Programme during the period 
Ap ril 1, 1977 to March 31 , 1978? 
. . . . . . . . . . . .. Ye s 
" It • • • " • " " • • " " No 
If the answer is ' Yes ' 
when did you come to know? 
Aus season ? 
Aman s e ason ? 
Boro season ? 
lJow did you come to know? 
By newspaper ? 
By Radio ? 
From Neighbour ? 
From Union Council Member ? 
From Union/Village Agricultural Assistant ? 
From Bank Employees ? 
Other Sources ? 
Q. 3(a) Did you apply for a loan from this Programme? 
Q . 4 . 
Q. 5 . 
Yes No 
If the answer lS ' Yes ' then why did you not g e t a loan? 
If the answe r lS ' No ' the n why did you not apply ? 
--------------------------------
no need of crop loan? 
did you b e lieve that the loan will 
not b e granted? 
other (what are the reasons? 
If you could borrow Tk . 1000 from a bank for a period of one year, 
how much would you like to borrow? 
Amount (Taka) 
Purpose 
If you could borrow Tk . 1000 from a bank for a period of one year , 
how much would you like to borrow? (Other than the purposes as 
mentioned in Q.4 . ) 
Amount (Taka) 
Purpose 
1 35 
Q. 6 . If you could borrow any amount of mon e y for a period of three y ears, 
how much would you like to borrow? 
Amount (Taka) 
Purpose 
Q. 7 . Did you take a loan (cash/kind) from any other sources between 
April 1977 - March 1978? 
Yes 
If the answer is ' Yes ' 
Amount (Taka) 
Purpos e 
Amount outstanding (Taka) 
. . . . . . • . • . .. No 
Q. 8 . Did you take a loan (cash/kind) from any other sources before 
l\pril 1977? 
Yes 
If the answer is ' Yes ' 
Amount (Taka ) 
Purpose 
Amount outstanding (Taka ) 
. • . . . . • . . • . • No 
Name of District 
Dinajpur 
Rangpur 
Myme n sin<jh 
Kushtia 
Rajshahi 
Jessore 
Barisal 
Patuakhali 
Faridpur 
Noakhali 
Khulna 
Pabna 
Bogra 
Tanga i 1 
Sylhet 
APPENDIX C 
NUMBER OF DISTRICT , THANA , UNION AND 
VILLAGE COVERED IN THE SURVEY 
No . of Thana No . of Union No . of Village 
3 3 9 
2 2 6 
3 3 9 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
1 1 3 
1 1 3 
2 2 6 
2 2 6 
136 
C 
Xl . 50 
2 
. 29 Xl 
3 
. 14 Xl 
X2 
. 24 
2 
. 26 X2 
X3 . 01 
2 
. 01 X3 
X4 
. 09 
D1 . 25 
D2 . 08 
D3 . 14 
D4 - . 03 
D5 . 17 
Xl 
. 86 
. 79 
.16 
.1 4 
- . 00 
. 03 
. 06 
. 21 
. 06 
- . 05 
- . 05 
. 17 
2 
Xl 
. 98 
0.02 
0.02 
- 0 .01 
- . 00 
- . 00 
. 07 
- .01 
- . 03 
- . 02 
. 08 
3 
Xl 
- . 00 
- . 00 
- . 01 
- .01 
- . 01 
.03 
- . 01 
- . 03 
- . 02 
. 04 
APPENDIX D1 
CORRELATION MATRIX (POOLED OBSERVATION) 
X2 
0 . 88 
- . 00 
- .00 
0 . 04 
- .05 
0 . 13 
- .01 
- . 03 
- . 04 
X 
2 
2 
- .02 
- . 01 
. 00 
- .03 
0.06 
.02 
- . 02 
- .02 
X3 
. 8 1 
- . 06 
- . 04 
- . 04 
- 0 . 01 
0 . 01 
0 . 04 
2 
X3 
- . 03 
- . 02 
- . 02 
- . 02 
. 00 
0 . 02 
X4 
- . 04 
- . 02 
0 . 11 
0.02 
0.01 
D1 D2 
- . 05 
- .14 - .19 
- 0.06 - . 10 
0 . 09 . 01 
D3 
- .14 
- . 18 
D4 
- . 04 
f-J 
W 
-...j 
c 
Xl . 38 
2 
Xl . 60 
3 
. 38 Xl 
X2 
. 20 
2 
X2 .33 
X3 - . 04 
2 
X3 - . 01 
X4 0 . 02 
Dl 
1 r-. ~::> 
D2 . 20 
D3 . 07 
D4 . J2 
Ds . 13 
? 
--1 
. 90 
. 77 
. 39 
. 34 
- .08 
- . 03 
0 . 01 
.10 
. 29 
- . 03 
- . 01 
- . 01 
v 
<-1 
2 
. 96 
. 31 
. 26 
- . 07 
- . 04 
. 00 
.08 
. 20 
. 01 
- .03 
- . 02 
3 
x 
. 19 
. 15 
- . 05 
- . 04 
- . 01 
.06 
. 12 
. 05 
- . 03 
- .02 
'-'\",.IJ.'--J..\....J.....J.J....J.C'l...L. ...L \",.I1.'i J.J....C"'l....L. ..L\....L.~\. \ V \...l...Ir...) ...JQ..llll::-'..Lt:: Vlle J 
X2 
. 94 
- . 05 
- . 04 
- . 02 
- . 05 
. 21 
- .08 
0 . 08 
- .04 
X 
2 
2 
- . 05 
- . 03 
- .02 
- . 05 
. 22 
- . 08 
. 05 
- .03 
X3 
. 93 
- .07 
. 04 
- . 02 
. 07 
- . 05 
- . 04 
X 2 
3 
- . 05 
. 05 
. 06 
. 04 
- . 04 
- . 03 
X4 
. 0 1 
- . 10 
. 02 
. 20 
- . 04 
Dl D2 
- .14 
- . 08 - . 21 
- . 06 - .08 
- . 04 - . 04 
D3 
- . 09 '-
- . 07 
D4 
. 02 
i--" 
L.... 
c:: 
C 
Xl . 50 
2 
. 25 Xl 
3 
. 15 Xl 
X2 
. 22 
2 
.25 X2 
X3 . 01 
2 
. 01 X3 
X4 . 01 
°1 . 29 
°2 . 04 
°3 . 15 
D4 - . 0 6 
°5 0 . 17 
Zl 
. 89 
. 82 
. 1] 
. 11 
. 00 
. 03 
. 06 
. 24 
- . 01 
- .0 5 
- . 06 
0 . 19 
2 
Xl 
. 99 
. 01 
. 02 
- . 02 
- . 01 
- . 01 
. 09 
- . 01 
- . 05 
- .03 
. 08 
X 3 
1 
- . 01 
. 00 
- . 02 
- . 01 
- . 02 
. 04 
- . 01 
- . 05 
- . 02 
. 04 
CORRELATION MATRIX (Sub - Sample Two) 
X2 
. 91 
. 02 
. 00 
. 07 
- . 05 
. 03 
. 04 
- . 06 
- 0 . 03 
2 
X
2 
- . 01 
- . 01 
. 01 
- . 02 
- . 00 
. 05 
- . 02 
- . 02 
X3 
. 84 
- . 07 
- . 06 
- . 04 
- . 03 
. 01 
. 04 
X 2 
3 
- . 04 
- . 03 
- . 02 
- . 04 
- . 00 
.02 
X4 
- .06 
. 03 
.11 
- . 02 
- . 00 
°1 °2 
- . 00 
- .16 - .16 
- . 05 - . 0 7 
. 12 . 03 
° 3 
- . 18 
- .23 
°4 
- . 05 
\-' 
W 
G 
APPE DIX E1 
RE SULTS OF REGRESSION ANALY SIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT USING NON- LINEAR MODEL 
(Up to 8 acrp.s) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
X 
s 
Std . Error 
Area Xl 750.35 591 . 70 
2 2 185.72 Area Xl -112 .73 
3 3 12.14 16.31 Area Xl 
Area rented out X2 483 .91 684.18 
2 2 
Area rented out X2 -15 0 .2 9 157.13 
Area mortgaged out X 3 
- 3960 . 20 1949.60 
mortgaged 2 2 6191 . 86 1902 . 79 Area out X3 
Area mortgaged In X4 768.45 663.94 
Fish culture in ve s trnen t Dl 1946.15 633.07 
Irrigation machinery D2 2169.07 603.65 
investment 
Business purposes D3 2404 .42 340.76 
Land purchase D4 1394.82 54 8 .45 
Milch cow purchase D5 941.06 771.70 
Constant " (' 944.52 
0 
R2 
= . 20 N = 598 
-2 R = . 19 F13 , 584 = 11 . 53* 
D. W. statistic = 1.76 
* Significant at 1 percent level 
** Signifi c ant at 5 percent level 
14 0 
T. Ratio 
1.27 
.61 
.74 
.70 
.95 
2.03** 
3.25* 
1.16 
3.07* 
3.59* 
7.05* 
2.54** 
1.21 
AP PE DIX E2 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT USING NON-LINEAR MODEL IN 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Area 
2 
Area 
3 Area 
Area rented out 
Area rented out 
Area mortgaged 
Area mortgaged 
Area mortgaged 
2 
out 
2 
out 
In 
SIX DISTRICTS 
(Sub- sample two) 
X 
s 
Xl 
Xl 
Xl 
X2 
X2 
X3 
X 3 
X4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
I\. 
B 
334 . 26 
78 . 52 
- 11 . 58 
-21 . 45 
4 . 44 
-15 79 . 34 
2015 . 84 
- 940.50 
Fish culture investment Dl 2118 . 04 
Irrigation machinery D2 1853 . 31 
investment 
Business purposes D3 1961.21 
Land purchase D4 2496.99 
Milch cow purchase 05 3489 . 79 
Constant B 858 . 41 
0 
2 
. 29 R = N = 181 
-2 
. 23 R = F13 , 167 = 5.22* 
D. W. Statistic = 1 . 27 
* Significant at 1 percent level 
** Significant at 5 perce nt level 
141 
Std. Error T.Ratio 
798 . 76 .42 
237.82 .33 
20.44 . 57 
774.84 .03 
152.37 .03 
3157 . 01 .50 
4088.50 .49 
1041.51 .90 
658 . 86 3.21 * 
606.75 3.05* 
453 . 89 4.32* 
992 . 30 2.51** 
1397.46 2.50** 
APPENDIX E3 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON EXPECTED DEMAND FOR 
CREDIT USING NON-LINEAR t-10DEL IN NINE DISTRICTS 
(Sub-sample one) 
Explanatory 
variable 
Area 
2 Area 
3 Area 
Area rented out 
2 Area rented out 
Area mortgaged out 
Area mortgaged out 
Area mortgaged In 
2 
Fish culture investment 
Irrigation machinery 
investment 
Business purposes 
Land purchase 
Milch cow purchase 
Constant 
R2 
= .22 
-2 R = 
N = 
x 
s 
8 
' 0 
417 
/'0, 
S 
637.04 
-74.89 
12 . 53 
2134.22 
-1017.42 
-3981.54 
6239.'00 
626.77 
1830.48 
3135.86 
2276.74 
1060.72 
165.09 
1172.68 
.19 F13 ,403 = 8.73* 
D.W. Statistic = 1.85 
* Significan t at 1 percen't level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** SigniCicLlllt Llt 10 percent level 
Stg.Error 
765.01 
245 .42 
21 .67 
1287.86 
480.71 
2465.06 
2300 . 02 
815.04 
899.71 
931 .46 
442.15 
660.30 
883.65 
142 
T.Ratio 
.83 
. 31 
.58 
1.66*** 
2.11** 
1.62 
2.71* 
. 77 
2 .03** 
3.37* 
5.15* 
1.61 
.19 
APPE DI X F l 
RESULTS OF REGRES SION ANALYSIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT USING LINEAR MODE L 
Explanatory 
variable 
Area 
Area rented out 
Area mortgaged 
Area mortgaged 
(Up to 8 acres) 
X s 
Xl 
X2 
out X 3 
In X4 
Fish culture investment Dl 
Irrigation machinery 
D2 investment 
Business purposes D3 
Land purchase D4 
Milch cow purchas e D5 
Constant 80 
R2 
= .19 N = 598 
-2 
. 17 R = F1588 = 14.97 
D. W. Statistic = 1.74 
* Significan t at 1 percent level 
** Significan t at 5 percent level 
*** Significan t at 10 percent level 
A 
535.44 
-139.92 
1890 . 59 
775.97 
1906 .76 
2250 . 76 
2412.67 
1481.10 
1286.61 
842. 75 
143 
Std. Error T.Ratio 
79.34 6.74* 
292.59 .48 
769.19 2.46** 
668 . 32 1.16 
635.93 3.00* 
607.00 3.71* 
342 . 46 7.05* 
546 . 75 2.71* 
738.61 1.74*** 
APPENDIX F2 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSI S ON EXPECTED DEMAND 
FOR CREDIT USING LINEAR MODEL IN' SIX DISTRICTS 
(Sub-Sample two) 
Explanatory /\ 
variable Xs S Std . Error 
Area Xl 347.20 93.01 
Area rented out X2 
-14.55 242.10 
Area mortgaged out X3 -21 .56 1145.01 
Area mortgaged In X4 
-904.74 1034.12 
Fish culture investment Dl 2043.28 649.60 
Irrigation machinery 
D2 1950.37 587.18 in ve s trnen t 
Business purposes D3 1991.83 448.25 
Land purchase D4 2575 . 36 968.66 
Milch cow purchase D5 3574.62 1385.14 
Constant B 1027.54 
0 
2 
. 28 181 R = N = 
-2 
.24 R = F9 ,171 = 7.41 
D. W. Statistic = 1.30 
* Significant at 1 percent level 
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T.Ratio 
3.73 
.06 
.02 
.87 
3.14* 
3.32* 
4.44* 
2.66* 
2.58* 
APPENDIX F3 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON EXPECTED 
DEMAND FOR CREDIT USING LINEAR MODEL IN NINE 
DISTRICTS 
(Sub- Sample one) 
Explanatory 
variable 
Area 
Area rented out 
Area mortgaged out 
Area mortgaged In 
Fish culture investment 
Irrigation machinery 
in ve s tmen t 
Business purposes 
Land purchase 
Milch cow purchase 
Constant B 
o 
R2 
= . 19 N = 417 
-2 
.17 R = F9 , 407 = 10.61* 
D. W. Statistic = 1 . 83 
* Significant at 1 percent level 
* * Signi fican t at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 10 pe rcent level 
685 . 66 
-387 . 11 
2233 . 32 
711 . 29 
1779.94 
3158 . 07 
2337 . 87 
1161 . 51 
531 . 27 
789 . 03 
Std. Error 
108.71 
528.70 
953.20 
823.97 
910 . 24 
937.03 
445.50 
665.91 
885.53 
145 
T. Ratio 
6.31* 
. 73 
2. 32 * * 
.86 
1.96** 
3.40* 
5.25* 
1.74*** 
. 60 
146 
APPENDIX F4 
SECOND CHOW TEST , NON-LINEAR MODEL 
* 
222 
I Le - ( Le 1 + Le 2 )] / k 
2 2 (Le
1 
+ Le )/ (n + n - 2k) 
2 ' 1 '2 
F = 
= l7920196175.72 - (6642321851.45 + 936817028.02)/14 
(7579138879.47) / (5 98-28) 
= 24361235 . 45 
7579138879.47/570 
= 24361235 . 45 
13296734 . 88 
F * = 1. 83 ~ 2 . 23 not significant 
F * = 
APPENDIX F5 
SECOND CHOW TEST, LINEAR MODEL 
l8 097949485 - (6894768467 + 947801549)J/10 
(7842570016)/578 
= 25537946 . 909 
7842570016/578 
= 25537946 . 9 
13568460.24 
F * = 1.88 L 2 . 23 not significant 
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